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Alderman v. United States

Supreme Court of the United States · 1969 · Constitutional Law
Constitutional LawCriminal ProcedureFourth AmendmentExclusionary RuleElectronic SurveillanceStandingFourth Amendmentstanding

Facts

The Government admitted that it had conducted electronic surveillance involving some of the petitioners, and the Court proceeded on the assumption for present purposes that the surveillance was illegal. In Alderman, petitioners alleged surveillance of Alderisio's place of business, and the Government had argued that no overheard conversation involving petitioners was arguably relevant to the prosecution. In the related cases, the Government admitted overhearing conversations of each petitioner, though the place and details of the surveillance were not yet developed in the record. The central dispute was whether defendants could object only to surveillance that violated their own Fourth Amendment rights and whether surveillance records should first be screened by the trial judge in camera before disclosure.

Issue

May a defendant suppress evidence as the fruit of illegal electronic surveillance when the surveillance violated only someone else's Fourth Amendment rights, such as a codefendant's or coconspirator's? If a defendant does have standing to challenge surveillance of his own conversations or his premises, may the trial court first review the surveillance materials in camera and disclose only those it deems arguably relevant, or must the materials be turned over to the defendant for adversary litigation of taint?

Rule

Suppression of evidence derived from a Fourth Amendment violation may be urged only by the person whose own rights were violated by the search or surveillance, not by one aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence; codefendants and coconspirators receive no special standing. A defendant's own rights are violated when the Government unlawfully overhears his conversations or conversations occurring on his premises, whether or not he was present or participated. In taint hearings involving such surveillance, the records as to which the defendant has standing must be disclosed to him without initial in camera screening for relevance, so that taint may be litigated through adversary proceedings.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
Federal agents illegally bug a warehouse office in Newark owned by Omar Vega. They overhear Omar and his alleged partner, Lena Ortiz, discussing delivery routes, and the leads from that surveillance help prosecutors build a case against both of them. Lena had no ownership or possessory interest in the office and was not present during later intercepted conversations among Omar and other workers.

At Lena's suppression hearing, she argues that all evidence derived from the illegal bug must be excluded from her trial because it was unlawful as to Omar and they were charged together. How should the court rule?

Explanation. The majority held that suppression may be urged only by the person whose own Fourth Amendment rights were violated, not by one aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence. Codefendants and coconspirators receive no special standing. Thus, if the surveillance violated only Omar's rights, Lena cannot suppress its fruits merely because the resulting evidence was used against her.