Allied International, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Association

United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1981 · Labor Law

640 F.2d 1368 (1981)

Updated July 31, 2026

laborsecondary boycottantitrustadmiralty tortNLRALMRA section 303section 8(b)(4)neutral employer

Facts

Allied imported Russian wood products under contracts with Soviet agencies and arranged shipment to the United States on Waterman ships unloaded in Boston by stevedore John T. Clark & Son, whose longshoremen came from an ILA hiring hall. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, ILA President Thomas Gleason ordered ILA members to stop handling all Russian ships and cargoes. As a result, Waterman cancelled scheduled U.S. port calls, unloaded Allied's cargo in Boston or Montreal, repudiated another shipment agreement, and Allied incurred storage, demurrage, and security costs. ILA and Local 799 later informed Allied that no ILA members would unload any cargo originating in the USSR.

Issue

Whether the ILA's politically motivated refusal to handle Soviet cargo constituted a prohibited secondary boycott under NLRA section 8(b)(4), notwithstanding that the dispute prompting the boycott was not a traditional labor dispute. Whether the same conduct also stated claims under the Sherman Act or admiralty tort law.

Rule

Section 8(b)(4) reaches domestic secondary activity directed by an American union against American employers and employees when application of the Act does not entail interference with the internal affairs of foreign employers or labor relations. A union violates section 8(b)(4) when it induces employees to engage in a concerted refusal to handle goods and an object of that conduct is to force a neutral employer to cease doing business with another; that prohibited object may be inferred from the virtually inevitable and foreseeable consequences of the boycott, and need not be the union's sole object. The section is not limited to disputes arising from traditional labor disputes, and political motivation does not remove otherwise prohibited secondary pressure from the statute.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Baltimore, the president of Harbor Freight Workers Local 18 ordered members employed by Chesapeake Port Services, a domestic stevedoring company, not to unload coffee beans originating in Brazil to protest Brazil's rainforest policies. Chesapeake had no labor dispute with the union, and the cargo belonged to Red Clay Imports, a Maryland company.

Red Clay sues under LMRA section 303, alleging a violation of NLRA section 8(b)(4). Which is the strongest argument that the complaint states a claim?

Explanation. The majority held that section 8(b)(4) is not limited to traditional labor disputes. A domestic union's politically motivated order to employees of a neutral domestic employer not to handle goods can violate the statute if the union induces a concerted refusal and an object is to force a person to cease doing business with another. That prohibited object may be inferred from the virtually inevitable consequences of the boycott.