Anderson v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc.

Supreme Court of Washington · 2011 · Evidence

172 Wash. 2d 593 (2011)

Updated August 22, 2026

EvidenceFryeexpert testimonyscientific evidencecausationgeneral acceptanceER 702novel science

Facts

Julie Anderson worked for Akzo Nobel Coatings and, although not officially part of her job, regularly mixed paint while employed there. She alleged that respirator rules were not rigorously enforced and that she was told she did not need a respirator when mixing toxic paint because monitoring had shown no health threat. Her son Dalton was later diagnosed with serious birth-related abnormalities, and Anderson offered expert testimony, especially from Dr. Khattak, that in utero exposure to organic solvents caused his malformations. After Anderson made safety complaints to the Department of Labor and Industries and Akzo was cited for safety violations, she was fired and then sued for negligence and wrongful discharge.

Issue

Whether Frye requires general acceptance in the relevant scientific community that a particular type of in utero toxic exposure causes a particular type of birth defect before expert causation testimony is admissible. The case also asked whether Anderson's wrongful discharge claim was cognizable and whether the trial court erred in refusing to strike Akzo's comparative negligence defense as to Anderson's own claims.

Rule

Frye is implicated only when expert evidence is based on novel science. Scientific causation testimony is admissible under Frye if the underlying theory and the technique or methodology relied upon by the expert are generally accepted in the relevant scientific community; Frye does not additionally require general acceptance of each specific causal conclusion or deduction drawn from generally accepted science. After Frye is satisfied or found inapplicable, the testimony must still satisfy ordinary evidentiary requirements, including relevance, helpfulness, qualification, and reasonable medical certainty or probability.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Spokane, Maya Torres sues her former employer, Cascade Harbor Finishes, alleging that repeated exposure to degreasing vapors during pregnancy caused her daughter’s neurological disorder. Maya’s toxicology expert relies on generally accepted principles that certain solvents cross the placenta and on standard epidemiological methods, but no consensus paper has yet concluded that this exact vapor causes this exact disorder.

Under the majority’s approach, should the trial court exclude the expert’s causation opinion under Frye solely because the scientific community has not generally accepted that precise vapor-disorder link?

Explanation. The majority held that Frye screens for novel science, not for scientific consensus on every increasingly specific inference. If the underlying scientific theory and the methodology used are generally accepted in the relevant scientific community, Frye does not separately require general acceptance of the expert’s exact specific-causation conclusion. Remaining concerns are addressed under ordinary evidentiary standards such as relevance, helpfulness, and reasonable medical certainty or probability.