Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.

Supreme Court of California · 1991 · Torts

TortsProducts liabilityStrict liabilityFailure to warnState of the artstrict products liabilityfailure to warnwarning defect

Facts

Plaintiff alleged he developed asbestosis and other lung ailments from exposure to asbestos products while working as an electrician at the Long Beach Naval Shipyard from 1941 to 1976. His pleadings included strict liability allegations that defendants failed to warn of asbestos dangers and asserted that defendants had prior knowledge from scientific studies and medical data. Defendants responded that the relevant risks were not known or scientifically knowable at the time their products were manufactured and distributed and sought to introduce state-of-the-art evidence to that effect. The trial court excluded that evidence and, because of the exclusion, refused to let plaintiff proceed on a failure-to-warn theory at trial.

Issue

In a strict products liability action based on alleged failure to warn, may the defendant introduce state-of-the-art evidence that the particular risk was neither known nor knowable by the scientific knowledge available at the time of manufacture or distribution? Put differently, is knowledge or knowability a component of strict liability for failure to warn?

Rule

In California strict products liability actions based on failure to warn, knowledge or knowability of the relevant risk is a component of liability. A plaintiff must show that the defendant failed to adequately warn of a particular risk that was known or knowable in light of the generally recognized and prevailing best scientific and medical knowledge available at the time of manufacture and distribution; accordingly, state-of-the-art evidence is relevant and admissible on the issue of knowability, subject to ordinary evidentiary rules.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In 1982, Ridgeway Solvents, a fictional manufacturer in Ohio, sold an industrial adhesive to cabinet shops in Columbus without any warning about a rare neurological injury. In a strict products liability action filed by Omar Vega, Ridgeway offers expert testimony that, in 1982, the injury had not yet been identified in the generally recognized scientific and medical literature.

Should the court admit the expert testimony?

Explanation. The majority held that in California strict liability actions based on failure to warn, knowledge or knowability of the relevant risk is a component of liability. Because a defendant may show that the particular risk was neither known nor knowable by the scientific knowledge available at the time of manufacture or distribution, state-of-the-art evidence is relevant and admissible, subject to ordinary evidentiary rules. The issue is not whether the manufacturer acted reasonably, but whether the product lacked an adequate warning for a risk known or knowable at the relevant time. (Derived from Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (n.d.).)