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Asarco, LLC v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2014 · Civil Procedure

Civil Procedurerelation backRule 15(c)statute of limitationsCERCLA contributionRule 6(a)anniversary methodRule 12(b)(6)

Facts

Asarco and Union Pacific both participated in mining-related operations at the Coeur d'Alene Superfund Site, and Union Pacific had previously filed bankruptcy proofs of claim against Asarco for, among other things, CERCLA response costs it had paid at that site. In 2008, the parties settled those claims in bankruptcy through an agreement containing a mutual release tied to "Remaining Sites Costs," defined as CERCLA response costs incurred by Union Pacific at specified sites including Coeur d'Alene. In 2009, Asarco separately settled with the United States and agreed to pay about $482 million to resolve remaining Coeur d'Alene liabilities. In 2012, Asarco sued Union Pacific for contribution, and after initially excluding the North Fork drainage area from its complaint, amended the complaint less than two months later to include it.

Issue

Whether Asarco's amended complaint was timely under CERCLA's three-year limitations period and Rule 15(c), and whether the 2008 settlement agreement unambiguously released Asarco's contribution claim so that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) was proper.

Rule

An amended pleading relates back under Rule 15(c)(1)(B) if it arises out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out in the original pleading, and this standard applies even when the amendment includes allegations expressly disclaimed in the original pleading. Rule 6(a)'s default method of computing time applies to a federal statute of limitations unless the statute specifies a different computation method, so the triggering day is excluded. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) based on an affirmative defense is proper only when the bar is obvious from the face of the complaint and judicially noticeable materials; if a settlement agreement is ambiguous, its interpretation presents a factual issue not resolvable on a motion to dismiss.

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Mira Stone filed a timely federal contribution action in Seattle concerning cleanup payments she made under a court-approved settlement for contamination at a large industrial corridor along the Columbia River. Her original complaint described the corridor broadly but stated that, for purposes of the action, it excluded a marsh parcel near Vancouver, Washington; six weeks later, after reviewing agency files, she amended to include that marsh parcel while relying on the same settlement and the same alleged historical disposal practices by the defendant, Alder Ridge Metals, Inc.

If Alder Ridge argues the amendment is time-barred solely because the original complaint expressly excluded the marsh parcel, how should the court rule?

Explanation. Rule 15(c)(1)(B) asks whether the amended claim arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out in the original pleading. Under the majority opinion, that same standard applies even when the original pleading expressly disclaimed facts later added. Because both pleadings center on the same cleanup settlement, the same historical operations, and the same contribution theory, the disclaimer alone does not defeat relation back. (Derived from Asarco, LLC v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2014).)