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Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku

Supreme Court, New York County · Civil Procedure

Civil ProcedureService of processAlternative serviceDue processCPLR 308(5)Domestic Relations Law 232Facebook servicesocial media service

Facts

The parties married in 2009 but never lived together, and the last address plaintiff had for defendant was an apartment he left in 2011. Defendant told plaintiff he had no fixed address or place of employment and refused to make himself available for service. Investigative firms, the post office, the Department of Motor Vehicles, and cell-phone billing inquiries all failed to locate a current address for him. Plaintiff communicated with defendant through what she identified as his Facebook account, submitted exchanges showing he regularly used that account, and had his mobile phone number so she and her attorney could alert him to check Facebook.

Issue

When a divorce defendant cannot be located for personal, substitute, or nail-and-mail service, may a court authorize service of the summons solely by private Facebook message under CPLR 308(5)? More specifically, was Facebook service here reasonably calculated to give defendant notice consistent with due process?

Rule

Under CPLR 308(5), a court may direct a manner of service not specifically prescribed by statute upon a sufficient showing that personal service, substitute service, and nail-and-mail service would be impracticable. Any court-devised method must also satisfy due process by being reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the defendant of the pendency of the action. Where the plaintiff sufficiently verifies that the Facebook account belongs to the defendant, shows that the defendant regularly accesses it, and lacks any viable email or physical address, service of a divorce summons solely through Facebook private message may be authorized.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In a divorce action filed in Manhattan, Elena Morris seeks permission to serve her spouse, Devon Price, by direct message on a social media platform. She knows Devon’s current apartment in Newark and his worksite in Jersey City, but says he is hard to catch in person because he works long shifts and often ignores the door.

Should the court authorize social-media-only service on this record?

Explanation. Under the majority opinion, court-directed service under CPLR 308(5) is available only after a sufficient showing that personal service and the statutory alternatives requiring a residence or business address would be impracticable. Here, Elena still knows Devon’s current apartment and workplace, so she has not established the impracticability predicate for bypassing those methods. Novel electronic service is not categorically barred, but it is not a first resort. (Derived from Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku (n.d.).)