Bird v. Parsons

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 2002 · Civil Procedure
289 F.3d 865
Updated
civpropersonal jurisdictioninternet jurisdictionRule 12(b)(2)Rule 12(b)(6)general jurisdictionspecific jurisdictionminimum contacts

Facts

Bird, an Ohio citizen, operated a software business using the name Financia and owned the domain name financia.com. Parsons registered efinancia.com through Dotster, an ICANN-accredited registrar, and parked the domain on Dotster's Futurehome page; Afternic later listed efinancia.com for sale on its domain-name auction site. Bird alleged trademark infringement, unfair competition, dilution, cybersquatting, and copyright infringement against Afternic, Dotster, and two Dotster-related individuals. As to Ohio contacts, Bird alleged that Dotster had done business with approximately 4,666 Ohio residents through its website.

Issue

Whether Ohio courts could exercise personal jurisdiction over the Dotster defendants based on Dotster's interactive website and alleged sales to Ohio residents, and whether Bird's complaint stated claims against Afternic and the Dotster defendants for trademark infringement, unfair competition, dilution, ACPA violations, and copyright infringement. Also at issue was whether the district court properly dismissed the Dotster defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction before reaching the merits.

Rule

For specific personal jurisdiction in the Sixth Circuit, the Mohasco test requires: (1) purposeful availment of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence there, (2) the cause of action must arise from the defendant's forum-related activities, and (3) the defendant's acts or their consequences must have a substantial enough connection with the forum to make jurisdiction reasonable. An interactive website can satisfy purposeful availment when it reveals intended interaction with forum residents, but general jurisdiction requires continuous and systematic contacts approximating physical presence. Separately, a domain-name registrar or auction-site operator does not, merely by registering, parking, or listing a domain name, "use" a mark for trademark infringement or unfair competition, engage in "commercial use in commerce" for dilution, or register, use, or traffic in a domain name within the meaning of the ACPA.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
Lakeshore Names, a Nevada domain-name registrar, operates an interactive website through which customers can purchase domain registrations and parking services. A Michigan software company sues Lakeshore Names in federal court in Detroit, alleging that Lakeshore registered an infringing domain for a third party; before any jurisdictional discovery, the company alleges that Lakeshore regularly completed thousands of paid registrations for Michigan residents through the site.

Assuming Michigan’s long-arm statute reaches as far as due process for this claim, is specific personal jurisdiction over Lakeshore Names most likely proper at the pleading stage?

Explanation. Specific jurisdiction is analyzed under the three-part Mohasco test: purposeful availment, arising from, and reasonableness. An interactive website can satisfy purposeful availment when it reveals intended interaction with forum residents, and regular acceptance of business from those residents supports that inference even if the residents initiated the contact. Because the claim here is tied to the registrar’s website-based registration activity, the plaintiff has made the type of prima facie showing accepted by the majority. (Derived from Bird v. Parsons (n.d.).)