Bousley v. United States

Supreme Court of the United States · 1998 · Federal Courts

Federal CourtsHabeas CorpusGuilty PleasProcedural DefaultSection 2255§ 2255§ 924(c)Bailey

Facts

In 1990, petitioner pleaded guilty to methamphetamine possession with intent to distribute and to "using" firearms during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime under § 924(c). He did not challenge the validity of his plea on direct appeal, but later sought collateral relief, arguing that the factual basis for the firearm plea was inadequate. While his appeal from the denial of collateral relief was pending, the Supreme Court decided Bailey, holding that § 924(c)(1) "use" requires active employment of a firearm, not mere possession or storage near drugs. Petitioner then argued that his plea was unintelligent because he had been misinformed about the elements of the § 924(c) offense.

Issue

Whether a defendant who pleaded guilty to "using" a firearm under § 924(c)(1) before Bailey may collaterally attack the plea as not knowing and intelligent, and if so, whether the claim is barred by Teague or by procedural default absent cause and prejudice or actual innocence.

Rule

A guilty plea is constitutionally valid only if it is voluntary and intelligent, and a plea is not intelligent unless the defendant has real notice of the true nature of the charge. A postconviction claim that a plea was unintelligent because the defendant was misinformed about the statutory elements is not barred by Teague when based on a later decision interpreting a criminal statute, but if the claim was not raised on direct review it is procedurally defaulted and may be heard on habeas only upon a showing of cause and actual prejudice or actual innocence. Actual innocence means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Phoenix, Daniel Mercer pleaded guilty in federal court to violating a criminal statute that everyone at the plea hearing described as covering any possession of a restricted device. Three years later, the Supreme Court interpreted the statute to require commercial distribution, not mere possession. Daniel files a § 2255 motion alleging that he pleaded guilty without real notice of the charge's true nature.

Which is the strongest assessment of Daniel's constitutional claim under the governing rule?

Explanation. A guilty plea is constitutionally valid only if voluntary and intelligent, and it is not intelligent unless the defendant had real notice of the true nature of the charge. The majority explained that if the defendant, counsel, and the court misunderstood an essential element, the plea would be constitutionally invalid. The rule does not require prosecutorial bad faith, and a later statutory-interpretation decision can reveal that the plea rested on misinformation about the offense's elements. (Derived from Bousley v. United States (n.d.).)