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Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association

Supreme Court of the United States · 2001 · Constitutional Law

Constitutional LawTortsState ActionSection 1983Fourteenth Amendmentstate actionentwinement§ 1983

Facts

The Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association is a not-for-profit membership corporation that regulates interscholastic athletics among Tennessee secondary schools, with public schools making up about 84% of its voting membership. Its governing legislative council and board of control were limited by bylaws to principals, assistant principals, and superintendents elected by member schools, and when the sanctions in this case were imposed all voting members of those bodies were public school administrators. Tennessee's State Board of Education had long acknowledged the Association's regulatory role, had previously designated it to supervise and regulate interscholastic athletics for public schools, assigned Board members to serve ex officio on the Association's governing bodies, and Association employees were eligible for the state retirement system. After Brentwood, a private member school, sent letters to incoming students and parents about spring football practice, the Association found a violation of its anti-recruiting rule and imposed probation, postseason ineligibility, and a fine.

Issue

Whether enforcement of the Association's recruiting rule against a member school constituted state action so that the Association could be sued under § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. More specifically, the question was whether a nominally private statewide athletic association should be treated as a state actor because of its relationship with Tennessee public schools and public officials.

Rule

State action may be found when there is a close nexus between the State and the challenged action such that the seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself. No single fact is necessary or always sufficient, but a nominally private entity is subject to constitutional standards when public institutions and public officials are pervasively entwined in its composition, management, control, and workings, absent some countervailing reason against attribution.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

The Ohio Scholastic Debate Council is incorporated as a nonprofit in Columbus and regulates debate eligibility for member high schools across Ohio. Eighty-eight percent of its voting members are public schools, its bylaws require all voting directors to be public-school principals or superintendents, meetings are often held during school hours, and the state board places two nonvoting ex officio members on its governing committees. After the Council suspends Lakeside Preparatory School for an eligibility violation, the school files a § 1983 suit.

Is the Council most likely a state actor for purposes of the suspension decision?

Explanation. The majority held that no single state-action test is exclusive. A nominally private association may be treated as a state actor when public institutions and public officials are pervasively entwined in its composition, management, control, and workings, absent some countervailing reason. Here, the overwhelming public-school membership, public officials serving in their official capacities, school-hour meetings, and top-down state-board involvement strongly support attribution of the suspension to the State.