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Bright v. Westmoreland County

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2006 · Civil Procedure

Civil ProcedureSection 1983Substantive Due ProcessState-Created DangerSupplemental JurisdictionGovernmental ImmunityDeShaneystate-created danger

Facts

Koschalk pled guilty to corrupting the morals of a twelve-year-old girl and was placed on probation with conditions barring contact with that victim and unsupervised contact with minors. A probation officer personally observed Koschalk unsupervised with the twelve-year-old victim, and probation officials initiated revocation paperwork, but a revocation hearing was not scheduled until weeks later; a police officer also allegedly told Bright immediate action would be taken, but Koschalk was not detained. Before the hearing occurred, Koschalk shot and killed Annette Bright, the eight-year-old sister of the earlier victim, allegedly in retaliation against the family. Bright alleged that the delay, the officer's assurances, and the probation officer's confrontation with Koschalk created a state-created danger under Section 1983.

Issue

Whether the complaint stated a substantive due process claim under the state-created danger doctrine where officials knew of a probation violation, delayed in seeking detention or revocation, assured the family that action would be taken, and previously confronted the probationer about the violation. Whether the district court also properly addressed the state-law claims by applying Pennsylvania immunity and declining supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims against Koschalk.

Rule

Under DeShaney, the Due Process Clause generally imposes no affirmative duty on the state to protect individuals from private violence absent custody. In the Third Circuit, a state-created danger claim requires: (1) harm that was foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) conscience-shocking culpability; (3) a relationship making the plaintiff a foreseeable victim or member of a discrete class; and (4) an affirmative use of state authority that created the danger or rendered the plaintiff more vulnerable than if the state had not acted at all. Liability is predicated on misuse of state authority, not on a failure to use it more effectively or expeditiously.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Toledo, Ohio, parole officer Dana Mercer learned that Victor Shaw had violated a court order barring him from contacting a former girlfriend. Mercer completed violation paperwork but did not seek immediate detention, and three weeks later Shaw attacked the girlfriend's brother at the family's home.

The brother sues Mercer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a substantive due process theory. Which is the strongest basis for dismissing the claim?

Explanation. Under the majority opinion, DeShaney bars liability for failure to protect against private violence absent custody, and the Fourth element of state-created danger requires an affirmative use of state authority that created the danger or made the victim more vulnerable than if the state had not acted at all. Delay in filing or pursuing revocation is nonuse of authority, not misuse of it. (Derived from Bright v. Westmoreland County (n.d.).)