Brown v. Brown

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth Appellate District · 2025 · Family Law

Family LawChild SupportDisabled Adult ChildDomestic Relations JurisdictionMootnessR.C. 3119.86Castle childdisabled adult child

Facts

The parties married in 1985 and had four children; one child, M.B., was born in 1997 with a chromosomal disorder and was severely disabled from birth. M.B. could not walk or talk, could not care for himself physically or mentally, and required daily lifelong care, including specialized medical equipment and feeding support. In temporary orders, the trial court initially found M.B. to be a Castle child and ordered the father to pay support, but later set that aside after concluding under Geygan that it lacked jurisdiction because M.B. had already turned 18 before the divorce decree. In the final divorce decree, the court again refused to award child support for M.B., and after the appeal was filed, M.B. died.

Issue

Does a domestic relations court have jurisdiction under former R.C. 3119.86 to enter a child support order for a disabled child whose disability existed before age 18 when the child was already over 18 at the time of the parents' divorce? Also, did the child's death during the appeal render the case moot where the appellant sought support retroactive to the filing of her counterclaim through the child's death?

Rule

Former R.C. 3119.86 extends the duty to support a disabled child beyond age 18 when the child's disability existed before attaining 18, and a domestic relations court may implement that duty by entering a child support order even if the parents do not divorce until after the child has turned 18. An appeal is not moot where the appellant still seeks meaningful relief in the form of a backdated child support award for a period before the child's death.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Columbus, Ohio, Dana Keller filed for divorce from Eric Keller in 2024. Their 24-year-old daughter, Lila, has had profound cerebral palsy since birth, cannot live independently, and no child support order was ever entered because the parties remained married until now.

Under the majority rule, may the domestic relations court enter a support order for Lila?

Explanation. The majority held that former R.C. 3119.86 extends the duty to support a disabled child beyond age 18 when the disability existed before age 18. A domestic relations court may implement that duty by entering a support order even if the parents divorce after the child has already turned 18. The court rejected any extra requirement that a support order must already have been in place before the child reached majority. (Derived from Brown v. Brown (n.d.).)