Burns v. Town of Palm Beach

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · 2021 · Property

PropertyFirst AmendmentDue ProcessEqual ProtectionZoningArchitectural Reviewexpressive conductTexas v. Johnson

Facts

Burns sought to demolish his existing traditional beachfront home and replace it with a much larger midcentury modern mansion that he said would express his personal philosophy of simplicity and individuality. Palm Beach required approval from its architectural review commission, which could deny structures not in harmony with nearby development or excessively dissimilar to structures within 200 feet. After multiple hearings and revised plans, the commission denied the permit, finding the proposal not in harmony with the area and excessively dissimilar in architecture, arrangement, mass, and related features. Burns's design also included walls, gates, heavy landscaping, and vegetation intended to screen the house from the street and neighboring properties.

Issue

Whether the district court improperly granted summary judgment before Burns had adequate discovery, whether the commission's architectural criteria violated the First Amendment by restricting protected expressive conduct, whether those criteria were unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause, and whether Burns showed a class-of-one equal protection violation.

Rule

Under Rule 56(d), a nonmovant must specifically identify the facts additional discovery would reveal and explain how those facts would create a genuine issue of material fact. Conduct is protected as expressive under Texas v. Johnson and Spence only if there is intent to convey a message and a great likelihood that viewers would understand some sort of message; even assuming residential architecture can qualify, a concealed private residence with no great likelihood of conveying a message to viewers is not protected expressive conduct. A civil zoning regulation survives vagueness review if it provides a rule or standard understandable to ordinary people and does not authorize arbitrary enforcement, and a class-of-one equal protection claim requires evidence of similarly situated comparators treated differently.

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In Santa Fe, Nadia Romero sued the City of Santa Fe after its design board denied her permit for a new residence. When the city moved for summary judgment early in the case, Nadia filed a Rule 56(d) declaration stating that she needed discovery on the board's "general practices, internal communications, prior applications, and any other materials that may reveal unfairness," and that she might depose board members after reviewing documents.

Should the court defer ruling on summary judgment under Rule 56(d)?

Explanation. Rule 56(d) requires the nonmovant to specify the facts additional discovery is expected to uncover and explain how those facts would rebut the movant's showing of no genuine issue of material fact. A request listing general topics like practices, communications, and prior applications is too vague. The majority held that such generalized requests are insufficient, especially when they do not tie specific sought facts to a material factual dispute.