Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy

Supreme Court of the United States · 1961 · Administrative Law

Administrative LawDue ProcessMilitary AuthorityDelegation of AuthorityFifth Amendmentprocedural due processmilitary base accesscommanding officer authority

Facts

Rachel Brawner worked for more than six years as a short-order cook for a private cafeteria contractor operating on the premises of the Naval Gun Factory, a restricted military installation engaged in highly classified naval ordnance work. Access to the installation required an identification badge issued by the Security Officer, and Brawner's badge was withdrawn after the Security Officer determined that she failed to meet the installation's security requirements; Admiral Tyree approved the action under a contract provision barring the contractor from employing personnel who failed to meet such requirements as determined by the Security Officer. The union requested a hearing with Gun Factory officials regarding the denial of admittance, but Admiral Tyree denied the request. Brawner remained free to work elsewhere and was offered work by her employer at another restaurant, which she declined because the location was inconvenient.

Issue

Whether the commanding officer of the Naval Gun Factory had explicit authority to deny Brawner access to the installation in the manner used, and if so, whether excluding her without notice of specific grounds and without a hearing violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Rule

Explicit authorization for exclusion from a military installation may be supplied by valid Navy Regulations approved by the President. In determining what process is due, courts must consider the precise nature of the governmental function involved and the private interest affected; the Fifth Amendment does not require a trial-type hearing in every case, and notice and hearing are not constitutionally required where the government, acting in its proprietary military capacity, summarily denies access to a specific military installation and the action neither bars the person from pursuing her occupation generally nor imposes a badge of disloyalty or infamy foreclosing other employment opportunities.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Norfolk, Virginia, Tidal Harbor Dining Services operates a snack bar inside a naval shipyard. The shipyard commander summarily revokes Lena Ortiz's entry badge after the security officer concludes she does not satisfy the installation's security requirements. The commander relies on a Navy regulation, approved by the President, stating that tradesmen and their agents may enter a command only as authorized by the commanding officer.

If Lena argues that the commander lacked legal authority to exclude her without a hearing, what is the strongest response under the governing rule?

Explanation. The majority held that explicit authorization may come from Congress or the President, and that Navy Regulations approved by the President carry the sanction of law. A regulation specifically allowing the commanding officer to admit or exclude tradesmen or their agents supplies the needed authority to summarily deny a concessionaire employee access to the installation.