Carr v. Deking
Facts
Joel Carr and his father George Carr owned farmland as tenants in common and had previously leased it orally to Richard Deking on a year-to-year crop-share basis. In 1987, after Joel sought cash rent, George and Deking, without Joel's consent or authorization, executed a written 10-year crop-share lease under which Deking would pay all fertilizer costs. Joel then gave Deking notice terminating the tenancy at the end of the 1987 crop year and sued to eject him. Joel also asserted George lacked mental capacity to enter the lease, but George was not joined as a party.
Issue
May a tenant in common who did not join in or consent to a lease executed by another cotenant eject the lessee from the commonly owned property? Also, did Joel Carr's affidavit create a genuine issue of material fact regarding George Carr's mental capacity to execute the lease?
Rule
Each tenant in common may use, benefit from, and possess the entire property subject to the equal rights of the other cotenants. A cotenant may lawfully lease his own undivided interest without the consent of the other cotenant; the nonjoining cotenant is not bound by the lease, but the lessee steps into the shoes of the leasing cotenant and becomes a tenant in common with the other owners for the duration of the lease. The nonjoining cotenant may demand to be let into copossession, but may not demand exclusive possession or eject the lessee; the proper remedy is partition. On summary judgment, unsupported conclusory statements in an affidavit cannot create a factual issue, including on mental capacity.
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If Nina sues to remove Prairie Hollow from the land entirely on the ground that she never consented to the lease, what is the most likely result?