Charisma R. v. Kristina S.

California Court of Appeal · Family Law
Family LawParentagePresumed ParentSame-Sex ParentingCustody and VisitationUPAsection 7611(d)section 7612

Facts

Charisma and Kristina were a same-sex couple who decided to have children together, jointly arranged for anonymous-donor sperm, and pursued Kristina's pregnancy through artificial insemination, with Charisma actively assisting in the process. After Amalia was born, the couple brought her into their shared home, gave her a hyphenated last name including Charisma's name, and shared parenting responsibilities until Kristina returned to work, after which Charisma cared for Amalia full time during the day and also at night. A few months after the birth, Kristina moved out with Amalia and thereafter largely prevented contact between Charisma and the child. On remand after an earlier appeal recognizing Charisma's standing, the trial court found Charisma was a presumed parent and that the presumption was not rebutted.

Issue

Whether substantial evidence supported the finding that Charisma qualified as a presumed parent under Family Code section 7611(d), despite the relatively short period during which she parented Amalia before Kristina moved out. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to rebut that presumption, whether the parentage determination violated Kristina's equal protection or due process rights, and whether the trial court had authority to allocate Charisma's travel expenses for reunification.

Rule

Under Family Code section 7611(d), read gender neutrally, a person is a presumed parent if the person receives the child into the person's home and openly holds out the child as the person's natural child. The statute contains no durational requirement; receipt into the home must be sufficiently unambiguous to declare the relationship, but need not continue for any specific period. A section 7611 presumption may be rebutted only in an appropriate action and only by clear and convincing evidence, and where the alleged parent actively participated in conception with the understanding of coparenting, voluntarily accepted the rights and obligations of parenthood after birth, and there is no competing claim to second-parent status, rebuttal based solely on lack of biological connection is improper absent other facts justifying rebuttal.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In Sacramento, Maya Levin and Tessa Cole jointly arranged donor insemination and agreed to raise any resulting child together. After the baby was born, they brought the child to their shared condominium, where Maya provided daily care for five weeks before Tessa abruptly moved out with the baby and cut off contact.

If Maya petitions to be declared a presumed parent under section 7611(d), what is the strongest argument against denying her claim solely because she lived with and parented the child for only five weeks?

Explanation. The majority held that section 7611(d), read gender-neutrally, requires actual receipt of the child into the home and open holding out, but does not impose any minimum duration of cohabitation or parenting. A short period may still be enough if the receipt is actual and unambiguous. Derived from Charisma R. v. Kristina S. (n.d.).