Childs v. Purll

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Torts

TortsNegligenceLandlord liabilityLead paintConsumer Protection Procedures ActCorporate officer liabilitysummary judgmentlead poisoning

Facts

Marcella Childs and her two young children rented an apartment owned by the Purlls and managed by Willoughby Real Estate Company from 1991 to 1995. The leases identified the children as occupants and stated that they were under eight years old when the tenancy began. In 1993, tests showed the children had elevated blood lead levels, and Childs sued alleging the apartment contained lead-based paint that caused their injuries. The defendants denied having notice of any lead hazard during the tenancy, and the trial court granted summary judgment to them.

Issue

Whether landlords and their agents may obtain summary judgment on negligence claims for lead poisoning where they lacked specific notice that lead paint was chipping or peeling, but they knew children under eight would occupy the premises and housing regulations required such premises to be maintained lead-free. The court also considered whether the former CPPA authorized plaintiffs' claims and whether individual corporate officers could be dismissed solely because they acted through the corporation.

Rule

When a housing regulation enacted to protect public safety applies to the plaintiff and the type of injury suffered, an unexplained violation renders the defendant negligent as a matter of law unless the defendant shows the violation was excusable or that it did everything a reasonably prudent person would have done to comply. Under 14 DCMR § 707.3, once a landlord or its agent is notified that children under eight will reside in residential premises, it has an affirmative duty to provide and maintain those premises in a lead-free condition, which supplies constructive notice of a lead-paint hazard for negligence purposes. Under the former CPPA private-action provision, no private action lay for claims arising in landlord-tenant relations or seeking damages for personal injury of a tortious nature. Corporate officers are personally liable for torts they commit, participate in, inspire, or knowingly consent to or acquiesce in, even absent veil piercing.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Washington, D.C., Nora Bennett leased an apartment from Maple Terrace Housing, managed by Harbor Stone Realty. The lease listed Nora's four-year-old son as an occupant, but the company never tested the unit for lead before move-in. Two years later, the child was diagnosed with lead poisoning allegedly caused by lead dust in the apartment.

If the landlord and manager move for summary judgment arguing they had no actual notice that paint was peeling or chipping during the tenancy, how should the court rule on the negligence claim?

Explanation. The majority held that when the landlord or its agent is notified that children under eight will reside in the premises, the housing regulation imposes an affirmative duty to provide and maintain the premises in a lead-free condition. That duty supplies constructive notice for negligence purposes, so the landlord cannot win summary judgment merely by showing no actual notice of peeling or chipping paint. To obtain judgment, the defendants would need to show the violation was excusable or that they did everything a reasonably prudent person would have done to comply. (Derived from Childs v. Purll (n.d.).)