Christensen v. Swenson

Supreme Court of Utah · 1994 · Torts

TortsRespondeat superiorScope of employmentVicarious liabilityemployer liabilityscope of employmentemployee breaklunch break

Facts

Burns employed Swenson as a security guard at Gate 4 of the Geneva Steel Plant, where guards worked eight-hour continuous shifts with ten- to fifteen-minute unscheduled paid lunch and restroom breaks. Gate 4 guards were expected to eat at their posts, and the Frontier Cafe across the street was the only nearby restaurant accessible within the short break period; its menu was posted near the telephone at Gate 4. During a lull in traffic, Swenson phoned in an order for soup, drove to the cafe to pick it up, and intended to return immediately to eat at her post. On the return trip, just outside Geneva property, she collided with plaintiffs' motorcycle.

Issue

Whether Burns was entitled to summary judgment on the ground that Swenson was acting outside the scope of her employment when the accident occurred during her short lunch trip to the nearby cafe. More specifically, the question was whether reasonable minds could differ under the scope-of-employment criteria so that the issue had to go to a jury.

Rule

Under respondeat superior, an employer is vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee acting within the scope of employment. Whether the employee acted within the scope of employment is ordinarily a question of fact and must go to the jury whenever reasonable minds may differ. Under Birkner, conduct falls within the scope of employment when it is of the general kind the employee is hired to perform, occurs substantially within the hours and ordinary spatial boundaries of employment, and is motivated at least in part by a purpose to serve the employer's interest; these criteria are not to be applied as a rigid bright-line rule, especially as to spatial boundaries.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

Nina Lopez works as a gate attendant for Harbor Crest Security at a freight terminal in Tacoma, Washington. She is on a paid continuous shift with only brief unscheduled breaks and, during a lull, drives two blocks to the only nearby sandwich counter to pick up a preordered meal and return to her post; on the return trip she hits a bicyclist.

If the injured bicyclist sues Harbor Crest Security under respondeat superior, which is the best argument against summary judgment for the employer?

Explanation. The governing rule is that scope of employment is ordinarily a question of fact, and summary judgment is improper whenever reasonable minds may differ. Under the three-part test, a jury could differ about whether the trip was of the general kind connected to Nina's job, occurred substantially within work hours and ordinary spatial boundaries, and was motivated at least in part by serving the employer's interests. The majority rejected rigid rules making all paid-break conduct inside the scope or all off-premises conduct outside it. (Derived from Christensen v. Swenson (n.d.).)