Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 1998 · Corporations

Updated August 22, 2026

Corporationsasbestos litigationclass actionconsolidationRule 23(b)(3)Rule 42(a)Seventh AmendmentErie

Facts

The district court managed thousands of asbestos cases through a phased plan. Phase I tried the ten class representatives' full cases and certain common issues; Phase III tried 160 sample cases only on whether each plaintiff had an asbestos-related disease and the amount of damages, while juries were told to assume sufficient exposure. For more than 2,000 remaining cases, the court awarded damages by assigning each case to a disease category and giving the average damages returned in the sample cases for that category. ACL was only a supplier of raw chrysotile asbestos to Fibreboard from 1951 to 1961; Fibreboard refined the asbestos and incorporated it into various finished products, including insulation products at issue here.

Issue

May a federal court in a diversity asbestos action use Rule 23(b)(3) and Rule 42(a) to determine causation and damages for large groups of plaintiffs through worksite/craft findings, sample trials, and extrapolated average awards rather than individualized jury determinations required by Texas law? Separately, may a raw asbestos supplier be held liable to plaintiffs injured by a finished manufacturer's insulation products where the raw material itself was not shown defective and the manufacturer was sophisticated and knowledgeable?

Rule

In a diversity tort action, federal procedural devices such as class actions and consolidation cannot abridge substantive state-law requirements or Seventh Amendment jury-trial rights. Where Texas law requires proof that a defendant's product caused a particular plaintiff's injury and requires damages to be determined for individuals rather than groups, causation and damages must be individually tried and determined; general or statistical proof cannot substitute. A supplier of a nondefective raw material sold to a sophisticated manufacturer of varied finished products is not liable for injuries caused by the finished product when the supplier did not participate in the design, manufacture, sale, or distribution of that finished product.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In a federal diversity products-liability action governed by Texas law, 600 welders and pipefitters from refineries in Houston sue one insulation manufacturer. The district court certifies a Rule 23(b)(3) class, tries common defect and warning issues once, and then instructs a later jury to assume each sample plaintiff had sufficient exposure to the manufacturer's product so the jury need decide only disease and damages.

If the manufacturer objects that Texas law requires plaintiff-specific proof that its product caused each plaintiff's disease, how should the federal appellate court likely rule?

Explanation. In a diversity tort case, Rule 23 and Rule 42 cannot abridge substantive state-law requirements or Seventh Amendment jury rights. Where Texas law requires proof that the defendant's product caused each plaintiff's injury, a jury may not be told to assume sufficient exposure and skip individual causation. Common-issue trials may be permissible, but they cannot substitute for individualized causation findings. (Derived from Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc. (n.d.).)