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Cleminshaw v. City of Norwich

United States District Court for the District of Connecticut · Civil Procedure

Civil ProcedureDiscovery sanctionsRule 37Rule 37Rule 37(b)Rule 37(d)discovery sanctionsattorney's fees

Facts

Plaintiff served interrogatories and a request for production in March 1980, but defendant did not respond for more than a year. After plaintiff moved to compel, Magistrate Eagan ordered defendant on June 5, 1981 to respond and to pay plaintiff's expenses, but defendant still did not comply by the June 19 deadline and did not serve responses until September 10, 1981. Plaintiff then renewed its sanctions motion, arguing both defendant's past disobedience and the alleged inadequacy of the eventual interrogatory answers. The court found the prior failures unjustified and primarily attributable to Attorney S, while Attorney Z remained counsel of record and thus also bore some responsibility.

Issue

Whether the court should impose Rule 37 sanctions for defendant's discovery conduct, including default or striking pleadings, and whether the court may instead or additionally impose monetary sanctions personally on counsel, including a fine payable to the court, for past unjustified discovery violations. The court also had to decide whether defendant was still in violation based on the allegedly inadequate interrogatory answers.

Rule

Under Rules 37(b) and 37(d), when a party fails to provide discovery or disobeys discovery orders, the court may make such orders as are just, including the sanctions listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)-(C), and shall require the offending party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees caused by the failure unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make such an award unjust. Where counsel is responsible for the violations, counsel may be held personally liable, and the court may, when just and reasonable and consistent with due process, impose an additional fine payable to the court under Rule 37 and its inherent authority to manage litigation and deter abuse.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In a federal contract case in Hartford, Maya Lopez served interrogatories and document requests on Ridgeview Masonry, represented by attorney Nolan Price. Ridgeview ignored the requests for ten months and then ignored a magistrate judge's order compelling responses by a set date, but finally served written answers to every interrogatory and a written document response two days before the sanctions hearing.

Maya moves for default judgment, to strike Ridgeview's answer, and for $400 in fees. Ridgeview offers no substantial justification for the earlier delay. What is the best ruling?

Explanation. The majority held that eventual compliance does not moot sanctions for past violations, but harsh sanctions like default or striking pleadings were inappropriate where the present record did not establish a continuing violation. Rules 37(b) and 37(d) create a presumption in favor of awarding reasonable expenses unless the failure was substantially justified or unjust under the circumstances, and those expenses may be assessed personally against counsel responsible for the misconduct. (Derived from Cleminshaw v. City of Norwich (n.d.).)