Commonwealth v. Nesbitt

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts · 2008 · Evidence
452 Mass. 236 (2008)
Updated
EvidenceConfrontation ClauseHearsayDying DeclarationsSpontaneous UtterancesDNA EvidenceCrawfordDavis

Facts

Shortly after being stabbed twenty-three times, the victim called 911, begged for immediate help, said someone had come into her house and tried to kill her, and identified Ralph Nesbitt as the assailant. Moments later, her neighbor and cousin found her lying in blood in the hallway, and when he asked what had happened, she said, "Ralph did this to me" and pleaded not to die; she died about fifteen minutes later. At trial, the Commonwealth also introduced evidence that blood on a bicycle handlebar yielded only a very low-level DNA mixture from which neither the victim nor the defendant could be excluded, though the analyst also acknowledged essentially no one could be excluded. The defendant objected to the victim's statements but not to the DNA testimony.

Issue

Whether admission of the victim's statements during the 911 call and to her neighbor violated the defendant's confrontation rights because the statements were testimonial. Also, whether admission of inconclusive DNA evidence from the bicycle created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.

Rule

A challenged out-of-court statement must first satisfy a hearsay exception and then be evaluated under Crawford-Davis-Gonsalves. Statements made in response to law-enforcement questioning are testimonial per se unless the questioning is meant to secure a volatile scene or establish the need for or provide medical care; the primary-purpose inquiry considers whether the declarant described events as they were happening, whether there was an ongoing emergency, whether the questions were necessary to resolve that emergency, and the level of formality. Statements not made to law enforcement are not testimonial per se, but are testimonial in fact only if a reasonable person in the declarant's position would anticipate the statement being used in investigating and prosecuting a crime. Separately, a common-law dying declaration by a homicide victim made under belief of imminent death concerning the cause or circumstances of the impending death is admissible even if testimonial. Inconclusive DNA evidence is admissible only if probative of an issue of consequence; otherwise its slight value may be substantially outweighed by prejudice and misleading effect.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In a homicide trial in Worcester, the prosecution offers a victim’s recorded 911 call. During the call, made seconds after a shooting, the victim screamed for help, said "someone just shot me," identified Leo Garner when the dispatcher asked who did it, and begged for an ambulance. The defense objects on confrontation grounds.

What is the best analysis of admissibility?

Explanation. The court requires a two-part inquiry: first, the statement must satisfy a hearsay exception; second, it must satisfy confrontation analysis. A 911 operator is treated as a law-enforcement agent, but responses to questioning are not testimonial per se when the primary purpose is to secure a volatile scene or obtain medical help during an ongoing emergency. Here, the victim’s frantic plea for help and identification during emergency-focused questioning make the statement admissible if it also qualifies under a hearsay exception such as spontaneous utterance.