Commonwealth v. Welansky

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts · 1944 · Criminal Law

Criminal Lawmanslaughterwanton or reckless conductomission liabilityduty to business inviteesnightclub firecriminal responsibilitycorporate domination

Facts

Welansky completely dominated and controlled the corporation operating the Cocoanut Grove night club, took its profits, supervised the premises regularly, and did not show that responsibility for exit safety had been delegated to anyone else. The club had overcrowded conditions and several exits that were hidden, locked, inward-swinging, obstructed, or effectively unusable, and those conditions existed as part of the regular system before Welansky was hospitalized. On November 28, 1942, a match lit by a bar boy ignited decorations in the basement lounge, and the fire spread rapidly through the club while lights soon went out and patrons panicked. Many patrons died near locked or obstructed exits, including exits that firemen had to force open from outside.

Issue

Can a person who controls business premises be convicted of involuntary manslaughter when he did not intentionally cause the fire, but intentionally failed to maintain safe means of egress for patrons in reckless disregard of the probable consequences of a fire? Also, may such liability rest on omissions where the defendant owed invitees a duty of care?

Rule

At common law in Massachusetts, involuntary manslaughter requires wanton or reckless conduct, not mere negligence or gross negligence. Wanton or reckless conduct may consist of an intentional act or, where there is a duty to act, an intentional omission involving a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result; a defendant is treated as knowing the danger if he knows facts that would cause a reasonable person to realize it. Where death results from such wanton or reckless conduct, the actor is guilty of manslaughter, and it is unnecessary to prove that the defendant caused the fire itself if death resulted from his wanton or reckless disregard of patron safety in the event of fire from any cause.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Providence, Lena Ortiz owns and personally runs Harbor Lantern Hall, a for-profit banquet venue open to the public. To prevent guests from slipping out without paying bar tabs, she directs staff every weekend to bolt a marked side exit from the inside; during a small electrical fire started by a guest's phone charger, several patrons die in a crush at that exit.

Under the governing doctrine, which is the strongest basis for involuntary manslaughter liability against Lena?

Explanation. The rule is that involuntary manslaughter may rest on wanton or reckless conduct, including an intentional omission where the defendant has a duty to act. A person controlling premises open to business visitors owes a duty of care regarding their safety, including safe means of egress in the event of fire. The Commonwealth need not prove the defendant caused the fire itself; it is enough that death resulted from her wanton or reckless disregard of patron safety. Mere negligence is insufficient, and ownership alone does not automatically create criminal liability.