Coster v. UIP Companies, Inc.

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware · 2023 · Corporations
Corporationsstockholder voting rightsdirector electionsenhanced scrutinyUnocalSchnellBlasiusenhanced scrutiny

Facts

Coster and Schwat each owned fifty percent of UIP and deadlocked in repeated efforts to elect directors. Coster then filed a custodian action seeking appointment of a broadly empowered custodian, which the Court of Chancery found threatened UIP because many key contracts could be terminated if such a custodian were appointed. In response, UIP's board issued a one-third equity interest to Bonnell, a long-time and important employee who had long been promised equity, for a price previously found entirely fair. The stock sale diluted Coster from one-half to one-third ownership, broke the deadlock, and mooted the custodian action.

Issue

When a board issues stock in a way that interferes with director elections or stockholder voting rights in a control dispute, what standard governs review of that action? Under that standard, did UIP's board act improperly or without sufficient justification when it approved the stock sale to Bonnell?

Rule

When a stockholder challenges board action that interferes with the election of directors or a stockholder vote in a contest for corporate control, enhanced scrutiny under Unocal governs and can subsume Schnell and Blasius concerns. The board bears the burden to show, first, that it faced a real, nonpretextual threat to an important corporate interest or significant corporate benefit and that its motivations were proper, not selfish or disloyal; and second, that its response was reasonable in relation to the threat and was not preclusive or coercive of the stockholder franchise.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
Lakefront Transit Solutions, Inc., a Delaware corporation based in Chicago, has two 45% stockholders, Nina Patel and Owen Mercer, and a 10% employee stockholder, Carla Ruiz. After Nina launches a proxy contest to replace two directors, the board sells newly issued shares to Carla at a concededly fair price, reducing Nina to 30% and preserving the incumbents' majority.

If Nina challenges the issuance, which standard should a Delaware court apply?

Explanation. When board action interferes with the election of directors or stockholder voting rights in a contest for control, Delaware applies Unocal enhanced scrutiny, which subsumes Schnell and Blasius concerns in this context. Fair price alone does not end the inquiry, because entire fairness is not a substitute for separate equitable review of voting interference. The board must show a real, nonpretextual threat, proper motives, and a reasonable, noncoercive, nonpreclusive response. (Derived from Coster v. UIP Companies, Inc. (n.d.).)