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Davis v. Federal Election Commission

Supreme Court of the United States · 2008 · Constitutional Law

Constitutional LawFirst AmendmentCampaign FinanceStandingMootnessFirst Amendmentcampaign financeself-financing candidates

Facts

Federal law ordinarily imposed the same contribution limits and coordinated party expenditure limits on all candidates for a House seat. BCRA § 319(a) changed that when a candidate's spending of personal funds caused the opposition personal funds amount to exceed $350,000: the self-financing candidate remained subject to the ordinary limits, while the opponent could receive triple-sized individual contributions, even from donors who had reached the normal aggregate cap, and unlimited coordinated party expenditures. Section 319(b) required the self-financing candidate to file a declaration of intent and rapid notifications disclosing personal expenditures to the FEC, opposing candidates, and national parties, with possible civil and criminal penalties for noncompliance. Davis, who spent substantial personal funds in prior races and declared his intent to spend $1 million of personal funds in 2006, sued to challenge both the asymmetrical limits and the disclosure requirements.

Issue

Does BCRA § 319 violate the First Amendment by burdening a candidate's use of personal funds for campaign speech through an asymmetrical contribution scheme that benefits the opponent, and by requiring disclosures designed to implement that scheme? Also, did Davis have standing and was the case moot?

Rule

A candidate has a First Amendment right to spend unlimited personal funds for campaign speech, and a statute substantially burdens that right when the candidate's personal expenditures trigger discriminatory fundraising advantages for an opponent. Such a burden is unconstitutional unless justified by a compelling state interest, and interests in leveling electoral opportunities or offsetting advantages of wealth are not sufficient. Disclosure requirements that significantly burden First Amendment rights must satisfy exacting scrutiny by showing a substantial relation to a sufficiently weighty governmental interest; when they are designed to implement an unconstitutional scheme, they cannot be justified.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

Congress enacts a statute for U.S. House races providing that once a candidate in Ohio spends more than $400,000 of personal funds, only that candidate's opponent may accept individual contributions at four times the ordinary limit and may receive unlimited coordinated party expenditures. Lena Ortiz, running in Toledo, plans to spend $900,000 of her own money and sues before the general-election campaign begins.

How should a court rule on Lena's First Amendment challenge to the statute's fundraising-advantage provision?

Explanation. The majority held that a candidate has a First Amendment right to spend unlimited personal funds for campaign speech, and a law substantially burdens that right when the candidate's personal spending triggers more favorable contribution rules for the opponent. Such an asymmetrical scheme cannot stand absent a compelling interest. The Court rejected leveling electoral opportunities or offsetting wealth as a sufficient justification. Actual acceptance of the increased contributions is not necessary to establish the constitutional defect in the scheme.