Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Commission

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Federal Courts

Federal CourtsFirst AmendmentFree ExerciseEstablishment Clausereligious schoolemployment discriminationOhio Civil Rights ActOCRC jurisdiction

Facts

Dayton Christian Schools (DCS) is a pervasively religious school whose teachers are selected for their ability to integrate Christian beliefs into all instruction and whose staff and parents must subscribe to the school's religious commitments. After teacher Linda Hoskinson informed DCS that she was pregnant, the school first told her she would not be rehired because of its belief that mothers of preschool children should remain at home, and later discharged her after she consulted an attorney, citing violation of the school's biblically based Chain-of-Command for resolving disputes internally. Hoskinson filed a sex-discrimination charge with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, which investigated, requested extensive school records, found probable cause, and proposed conciliation terms including reinstatement, back pay, and continuing compliance review. DCS and related plaintiffs then sued under § 1983, alleging that application of the Ohio Civil Rights Act to these employment decisions violated the First Amendment.

Issue

Whether the Ohio Civil Rights Commission may constitutionally assert jurisdiction under the Ohio Civil Rights Act over discrimination charges against a pervasively religious school when the challenged employment decisions were made pursuant to sincerely held religious beliefs. The court also considered whether application of the Act in this context violated the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.

Rule

If application of a statute to a religious institution presents serious constitutional questions, a court first asks under Catholic Bishop whether the legislature clearly intended the statute to apply. If clear legislative intent exists, the statute still may not be applied where, in this context, its enforcement affirmatively and coercively burdens sincerely held religious beliefs without accommodation and is not the least restrictive means of serving the state's interest, and where the resulting inquiry into motives, good faith, and teacher-selection decisions at a pervasively religious school creates excessive church-state entanglement.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

A church-run K-6 school in Columbus requires every teacher to integrate scripture into math, reading, and recess activities. After a teacher files a sex-discrimination charge over a dismissal allegedly based on the school's sincerely held religious view of family roles, the state civil rights bureau invokes a statute defining "employer" broadly to include any organization with four or more employees, while separately creating narrow exemptions for some housing and religion-based preferences.

If the school argues that the statute should be construed not to reach religious schools at all in order to avoid constitutional problems, how should a court applying the majority's approach rule?

Explanation. The majority used the Catholic Bishop inquiry first: whether jurisdiction raises serious constitutional questions, and if so whether there is clear affirmative legislative intent to extend coverage. It found serious constitutional questions, but also found clear legislative intent because the statute broadly defined employers and included some express exemptions, while not exempting the charged conduct. So avoidance could not eliminate the constitutional issue. (Derived from Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Commission (n.d.).)