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Dolan v. City of Tigard

Supreme Court of the United States · 1994 · Property
PropertyConstitutional Lawtakingsexactionsrough proportionalityTakings Clausepermit conditionsdedications

Facts

Florence Dolan owned a plumbing and electric supply store in Tigard's Central Business District on a 1.67-acre parcel partly within the 100-year floodplain of Fanno Creek. She applied for a permit to nearly double the size of her store and pave a 39-space parking lot, changes that would increase impervious surface and intensify site use. The city approved the permit on condition that she dedicate the floodplain portion of her land for storm drainage purposes and an additional 15-foot strip for a pedestrian/bicycle pathway, together amounting to about 7,000 square feet. The city found that the project would increase storm-water runoff and traffic, and that the dedications would help address flooding and congestion.

Issue

When a city conditions approval of a building permit on the owner's dedication of land for public purposes, what degree of connection must exist between the exaction and the projected impacts of the proposed development to satisfy the Takings Clause? More specifically, were Tigard's floodplain and pathway dedication requirements constitutionally justified on this record?

Rule

A permit condition requiring dedication of property must satisfy two requirements under the Takings Clause. First, there must be an 'essential nexus' between the legitimate state interest and the condition exacted; second, the city must make an individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development, a standard the Court described as 'rough proportionality.' No precise mathematical calculation is required, but conclusory or generalized statements are insufficient.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In Boise, a property owner named Lena Ortiz seeks a permit to replace a one-story garden shop with a larger building and a paved lot. The city approves the permit only if she grants a public riverwalk easement across the rear of her parcel, explaining that the bigger building will block scenic views from a nearby street.

Under the controlling doctrine, is the riverwalk easement most likely constitutional?

Explanation. A permit exaction requiring dedication of property must first bear an essential nexus to the legitimate state interest asserted. Here, preserving views from the street does not match a condition granting the public a riverwalk easement across the land. As in the governing rule, a mismatch between the problem identified and the property interest exacted fails at the nexus stage, regardless of whether the city might otherwise regulate the project.