Dowling v. United States

Supreme Court of the United States · 1990 · Evidence

493 U.S. 342 (1990)

Updated August 1, 2026

Evidenceacquitted conduct404(b)Double Jeopardycollateral estoppelRule 404(b)Rule 403Due Process

Facts

At Dowling's bank robbery trial, the Government introduced testimony from Vena Henry that about two weeks after the robbery, a masked man carrying a small handgun entered her home with another man and that she unmasked and identified Dowling. Dowling had previously been acquitted of charges arising from that incident. The Government offered Henry's testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to strengthen identification of Dowling as the bank robber and to link him with Delroy Christian. The trial court admitted the testimony and instructed the jury that Dowling had been acquitted of robbing Henry and that the testimony was admitted for a limited purpose.

Issue

Does the Double Jeopardy Clause's collateral-estoppel component, or the Due Process Clause's guarantee of fundamental fairness, bar the Government from introducing Rule 404(b) evidence concerning conduct for which the defendant was previously acquitted?

Rule

A prior acquittal does not automatically bar the Government from introducing evidence relating to that conduct in a later criminal trial under Rule 404(b). The collateral-estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause applies only when the prior acquittal determined an ultimate issue in the later case, and it does not preclude relitigation where the later use of the evidence is governed by a lower standard of proof such that a jury could reasonably conclude the act occurred even though a prior jury did not find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A defendant invoking collateral estoppel bears the burden of showing that the issue he seeks to foreclose was actually decided in the prior proceeding. Admission of such evidence does not violate due process unless it is so extremely unfair that it violates fundamental conceptions of justice.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In a federal prosecution in Chicago for interstate truck hijacking, the government offers testimony that Malik Rowan previously participated in an unrelated warehouse break-in in Milwaukee. Malik had been acquitted of charges from the Milwaukee incident. The prosecutor offers the testimony only to show identity and association with a codefendant, not to prove any element that must be decided in the hijacking case.

If Malik argues that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars admission of the Milwaukee testimony solely because he was acquitted of that conduct, what is the best answer?

Explanation. The majority held that the collateral-estoppel component of double jeopardy does not exclude all otherwise relevant evidence merely because it relates to conduct for which the defendant was acquitted. The key question is whether the prior acquittal determined an ultimate issue in the later prosecution. When it did not, the Constitution does not automatically bar the evidence.