Dragomir v. Spring Harbor Hospital

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · 2009 · Corporations

970 A.2d 310 (2009)

Updated August 22, 2026

Corporationsvicarious liabilitynegligent supervisionscope of employmentrespondeat superiorRestatement (Second) of Agency § 228special relationshipfiduciary relationship

Facts

Dragomir was admitted to Spring Harbor in April 2000 for treatment of mental illness and drug and alcohol abuse, and social worker Eric Richardson treated him as both an inpatient and outpatient until January 2001. Beginning in May 2000, Richardson and Dragomir entered into a sexual relationship that continued until July 2001; Richardson also supplied Dragomir with illegal drugs and alcohol, and nearly all of their social and sexual encounters occurred off hospital premises, except for one very brief sexual act in Richardson's office. The two concealed the relationship because they knew Richardson would lose his job if discovered. Dragomir later informed Spring Harbor, Richardson resigned, and Dragomir alleged that Spring Harbor was vicariously liable and had negligently supervised Richardson.

Issue

Whether Spring Harbor could be held vicariously liable for Richardson's sexual and related misconduct toward Dragomir, and whether Dragomir alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for negligent supervision against the hospital. More specifically, the negligent supervision question was whether Dragomir alleged facts that, if proven, would establish a special relationship with Spring Harbor under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315(b).

Rule

Under Maine law, an employer is vicariously liable only for employee conduct within the scope of employment as defined by Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228: the conduct must be of the kind the employee is employed to perform, occur substantially within authorized time and space limits, and be actuated at least in part by a purpose to serve the employer. A negligent supervision claim may be maintained if the plaintiff alleges facts that, if proven, establish a special relationship with the defendant under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315(b), and then proves the elements of Restatement § 317, including that the defendant knew or should have known of the necessity and opportunity to control the employee. For § 315(b) purposes, not every fiduciary relationship qualifies; only those marked by a great disparity of position and influence may constitute the requisite special relationship, determined case by case.

See the holding & full analysis

Create a free KwikCourt account to unlock the rest of this brief — and practice the case.

The court's holding and reasoning
Doctrine tests, pitfalls & exam hypotheticals
10 practice questions + 4 AI-graded essays on this case

Free sample · practice this case

Test yourself

One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

Lena Ortiz was receiving counseling at Pine Harbor Wellness Center in Portland, Maine, from Noah Bennett, a staff therapist. Over several months, Bennett secretly began a romantic and sexual relationship with Ortiz, meeting her at his apartment in South Portland after work.

If Ortiz sues Pine Harbor Wellness Center on a respondeat superior theory for Bennett’s sexual misconduct, which is the strongest argument against vicarious liability?

Explanation. Under Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228, as applied by the majority, an employer is vicariously liable only if the employee’s conduct is of the kind employed to perform, occurs substantially within authorized time and space limits, and is actuated at least in part to serve the employer. A therapist’s sexual relationship with a patient is entirely different in kind from authorized treatment, so that is the strongest basis for rejecting respondeat superior.