Durham v. Marberry

Supreme Court of Arkansas · Torts

TortsSurvival actionsWrongful deathDamagessurvival statuteloss-of-life damagesinstant deathstatutory interpretation

Facts

The co-administrators of Amanda Lynn Durham's estate sued Harold D. Marberry and Advantage Mobile Homes, Inc. after a mobile home transport vehicle collided with Durham's vehicle. It was undisputed that Durham was killed instantly in the accident. The estate asserted wrongful death and survival claims, including a claim for loss-of-life damages under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-62-101(b). The trial court ruled that such damages were unavailable because Durham did not survive for any period between injury and death.

Issue

Does Ark. Code Ann. § 16-62-101(b) permit a decedent's estate to recover loss-of-life damages when the decedent was killed instantly, or is some period of life between injury and death required?

Rule

Under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-62-101(b), loss-of-life damages are a separate and independent element of damages recoverable by a decedent's estate, and recovery does not require that the decedent survive for any period between injury and death. Because loss of life can occur only at death, such damages begin accruing when life is lost.

🔒

See the holding & full analysis

Create a free KwikCourt account to unlock the rest of this brief — and practice the case.

The court's holding and reasoning
Doctrine tests, pitfalls & exam hypotheticals
10 practice questions + 4 AI-graded essays on this case

Free sample · practice this case

Test yourself

One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Little Rock, Nora Patel was struck by a delivery van owned by Pine Terrace Logistics. Witnesses and medical records show she died on impact. Her estate filed a survival claim seeking damages for Nora's loss of life under Arkansas law.

Pine Terrace moves for summary judgment, arguing the estate cannot recover because Nora never lived for any measurable time after the collision. How should the court rule?

Explanation. The majority held that under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-62-101(b), loss-of-life damages are a separate and independent element of damages recoverable by the estate, and they do not require any interval between injury and death. Loss of life can occur only at death, so such damages begin accruing when life is lost. A defendant is therefore not entitled to summary judgment merely because death was instantaneous. (Derived from Durham v. Marberry (n.d.).)