Durham v. United States

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit · 1954 · Criminal Law
214 F.2d 862 (1954)
Updated
Criminal Lawinsanityproduct testinsanity defensemental diseasemental defectcriminal responsibilityburden of proof

Facts

Durham had a long history of psychiatric examinations, repeated commitments to St. Elizabeths Hospital, and prior adjudications of unsound mind. His only defense to the housebreaking charge was that he was of unsound mind when the offense occurred on July 13, 1951. At trial, Dr. Gilbert testified repeatedly that Durham was of unsound mind and that the period of insanity embraced the date of the offense, and Durham's mother testified that after his May 1951 discharge he seemed afraid of people and wanted steel bars placed on his bedroom windows. The trial judge nevertheless treated the case as involving no testimony concerning Durham's mental state on the date of the offense and relied on the presumption of sanity to convict him.

Issue

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that there was no evidence sufficient to raise the insanity issue and thus leaving the presumption of sanity controlling. Also, whether the District of Columbia should continue using the right-wrong test supplemented by irresistible impulse, or instead adopt a broader test of criminal responsibility.

Rule

Once some evidence of mental disorder is introduced, the presumption of sanity is no longer conclusive and the Government must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt as part of its case. The test of criminal responsibility in the District of Columbia is that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect. 'Disease' means a condition considered capable of improving or deteriorating, while 'defect' means a condition not considered capable of improving or deteriorating and which may be congenital, caused by injury, or the residual effect of physical or mental disease.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In a bench trial in Washington, D.C., Elena Torres is charged with arson. Her only defense is insanity, and a psychiatrist testifies that Elena was suffering from a psychotic condition at the time of the fire, though the psychiatrist cannot say whether Elena knew right from wrong; Elena's sister also describes paranoid behavior during the same month.

What is the strongest argument that the trial judge may not simply rely on the presumption of sanity to convict Elena?

Explanation. Once some evidence of mental disorder is introduced, the presumption of sanity is no longer conclusive, and the prosecution must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority made clear that testimony need not be framed in right-wrong terms to satisfy the some-evidence threshold, and lay testimony may also support raising the issue.