Dutton v. Evans

Supreme Court of the United States · 1970 · Evidence

EvidenceConfrontation ClauseHearsayCoconspirator statementsSixth AmendmentFourteenth Amendmenthearsaycoconspirator exception

Facts

At Evans' murder trial, one prosecution witness, Shaw, testified that codefendant Williams told him in prison, "If it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this now." Georgia admitted the statement under a statute allowing declarations of one conspirator during the pendency of the criminal project to be used against others, including during concealment. Evans objected that the testimony was hearsay and violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. Shaw testified in court and was cross-examined at length, while the prosecution's principal witness was an accomplice eyewitness who described the murders in detail and was also extensively cross-examined.

Issue

Did the admission, under Georgia's coconspirator-type evidentiary rule, of Shaw's testimony recounting Williams' out-of-court statement violate Evans' Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to confrontation? More specifically, does the Confrontation Clause forbid a state from admitting such a statement merely because its hearsay rule is broader than the federal coconspirator exception?

Rule

The Confrontation Clause does not require exclusion of all hearsay and is not a constitutional codification of hearsay law. A state evidentiary rule does not violate the Constitution merely because it differs from the federal hearsay exception, and admission of an out-of-court statement does not deny confrontation where, in the circumstances of the case, the statement is not crucial or devastating, the in-court witness reporting it is subject to cross-examination, and the possibility that cross-examination of the declarant would show unreliability is wholly unreal.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

At a murder trial in Nashville, the prosecution offers testimony from inmate Leo Grant that codefendant Omar Pike told him in jail, "If Nora Bell hadn't dragged us into this, we wouldn't be sitting here." Tennessee law allows statements of criminal partners made while they are still trying to hide the crime to be used against each other, even though the federal coconspirator rule would not reach a concealment-stage remark. Grant testifies in court and is thoroughly cross-examined.

If Nora argues that admission of Grant's testimony automatically violates the Confrontation Clause because the state rule is broader than the federal rule, how should the court rule?

Explanation. The majority held that the Confrontation Clause is not identical to hearsay doctrine, and a state's evidentiary rule is not unconstitutional merely because it does not match the federal coconspirator exception. The federal limitation on concealment-phase statements was treated as a federal evidentiary policy choice, not a Sixth Amendment command. The correct analysis looks to the circumstances of admission, not automatic equivalence with federal hearsay law.