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Fare v. Michael C.

Supreme Court of the United States · 1979 · Criminal Procedure
Criminal ProcedureMirandaJuvenile InterrogationFifth AmendmentMirandajuvenilescustodial interrogationprobation officer

Facts

Police took 16 1/2-year-old Michael C., who was on juvenile probation and had prior experience with the juvenile justice system, into custody for questioning about a murder. After being fully advised of his Miranda rights, he asked, "Can I have my probation officer here?"; the officers said they would not call the probation officer then, reminded him of his right to an attorney and to remain silent, and Michael then said he wanted to talk. He made incriminating statements and sketches, and in juvenile proceedings he moved to suppress them on the ground that his request for his probation officer invoked his Fifth Amendment rights.

Issue

Does a juvenile's request during custodial interrogation to speak with his probation officer constitute a per se invocation of the Fifth Amendment rights protected by Miranda, requiring interrogation to cease? If not, are the juvenile's later statements admissible based on a valid waiver under the totality of the circumstances?

Rule

Miranda's per se rule applies when the accused requests an attorney or indicates a wish to remain silent. A juvenile's request for a probation officer is not tantamount to a request for counsel and is not, by itself, a per se invocation of the right to remain silent; instead, admissibility depends on whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the juvenile knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the rights to remain silent and to counsel.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In Phoenix, police arrested 17-year-old Devin Ortiz for questioning about an armed burglary. After receiving full Miranda warnings and stating he understood them, Devin asked, "Can my probation officer come in?" The officers said no one would be called right then, reminded him that he could remain silent and ask for a lawyer, and Devin replied, "No lawyer. I'll talk now."

If Devin moves to suppress his statements solely because he asked for his probation officer, how should the court rule?

Explanation. The majority held that a juvenile's request to see a probation officer is not per se the same as requesting counsel and is not automatically an invocation of the right to remain silent. The proper inquiry is whether the juvenile knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived Miranda rights under the totality of the circumstances. Because Devin expressly agreed to talk after renewed warnings, suppression is not automatic.