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First Bank of South Dakota v.?

Supreme Court of South Dakota · Contracts
Contractsjury instructionshearsayfiduciary dutydeceitharmless errorcumulative evidencejury instructions

Facts

Larry Byrne sought to develop and patent a commercial coal-pelleting process and was financed by First Bank of South Dakota and bank officer Bruce Walker. Byrne hired Lincoln Ainsworth under a commissions contract to market the process, and Ainsworth helped secure a January 1984 purchase agreement under which Frank Schultz agreed to buy the process for $2.25 million, with a downpayment, a later payment, and a promissory note for the balance. Schultz formed ICP, assigned the purchase agreement to it, and sought investors, but Schultz and ICP apparently did not perform their obligations, so Ainsworth received no commission beyond the initial downpayment commission. The Ainsworths then sued Walker and the Bank for fraud and deceit, intentional interference with contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and failure or refusal to pay the commission.

Issue

Whether the trial court committed reversible error by admitting alleged hearsay testimony and by instructing the jury in a way that allegedly failed to present the tort claims properly, misstated the deceit claim, or improperly defined fiduciary duty in the lender-borrower context. Also, whether any such error prejudiced the Ainsworths after the jury returned a defense verdict on liability.

Rule

Erroneous admission of hearsay does not require reversal when the evidence is cumulative of other admissible testimony and causes no prejudice. Jury instructions must be construed together and are not erroneous if, taken as a whole, they provide a full and correct statement of the law applicable to the case. A lender-borrower relationship does not ordinarily create a fiduciary relationship; such a relationship arises only with additional circumstances showing special trust accepted by the other party, resulting in dominion, control, or influence, and the trusting borrower must be in a position of inequality, dependence, weakness, or lack of knowledge.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In a contract-fraud trial in Omaha, Dana Mercer testified that she heard a distributor say the parties had orally extended a payment deadline. The judge admitted the statement over objection. Two other witnesses with personal knowledge later testified to the same alleged extension, and the jury returned a defense verdict supported by that direct testimony.

If the plaintiff appeals solely on the ground that Dana's testimony was hearsay, what is the most likely result?

Explanation. The majority rule is that even assuming evidence was hearsay, reversal is unwarranted where its admission caused no prejudice because it was cumulative of other admissible testimony. Here, the same point was established by other witnesses with personal knowledge, and the verdict was supported by properly admitted evidence.