First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County

Supreme Court of the United States · 1987 · Federal Courts

Federal CourtsTakingsJust CompensationRegulatory TakingsRipenessFifth AmendmentFourteenth Amendmenttemporary regulatory taking

Facts

After flood damage in Mill Creek Canyon, Los Angeles County adopted an interim ordinance barring construction, reconstruction, placement, or enlargement of buildings within a designated flood protection area that included the church's camp property. The church alleged that the ordinance denied it all use of Lutherglen and sought damages for that deprivation. California courts treated the complaint as alleging a taking of all use but struck the allegation as irrelevant because, under California law, damages were unavailable for a regulatory taking until the ordinance was first declared invalid. The merits of whether a taking actually occurred were not decided below.

Issue

When a landowner alleges that a land-use regulation has denied all use of property, may a State constitutionally limit the remedy to invalidation or other nonmonetary relief and deny compensation for the period before the regulation is held invalid? Put differently, does the Just Compensation Clause require compensation for a temporary regulatory taking?

Rule

The Fifth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, does not prohibit takings but requires just compensation when government action amounts to a taking. Where government regulation has already effected a taking by denying all use of property, the Constitution requires compensation for the period during which the taking was effective, even if the regulation is later invalidated, amended, or withdrawn.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

After a wildfire near Santa Fe, New Mexico, Rio Mesa County adopted an emergency ordinance barring any construction, reconstruction, or occupancy on parcels within a mapped debris-flow zone. In state court, the judges expressly assumed for purposes of the pleadings that the ordinance denied owner Elena Ruiz all use of her retreat property for three years, but dismissed her inverse-condemnation claim because county law allowed only invalidation of the ordinance, not damages, for a regulation later set aside.

If the ordinance is later invalidated, which result is most consistent with the governing constitutional rule?

Explanation. The Just Compensation Clause does not merely invalidate takings; it requires compensation when government action has already effected a taking. Where a regulation is assumed to have denied all use of property, later invalidation does not erase the duty to pay for the period during which the taking was effective. The majority specifically rejected a state rule limiting the owner to nonmonetary relief in that situation.