Fitzpatrick v. Michael

Court of Appeals of Maryland · 1939 · Contracts

Contractsspecific performancepersonal servicesexecutory contractcontract to make a willStatute of Fraudspart performanceequity

Facts

After Michael's invalid wife died, Michael asked Fitzpatrick, who had been serving as a practical nurse, to remain for the rest of his life, care for him and his home, and in return promised her $8 per week, a home with board while he lived, and by will his home and furnishings for her use and his automobiles absolutely. Fitzpatrick accepted and performed for about two years as nurse, chauffeur, companion, gardener, and housekeeper, and Michael executed wills reflecting those promised testamentary benefits. In April 1939 Michael abruptly ceased living at the home, cut off utilities and food, had Fitzpatrick arrested for trespass, and excluded her from the house. Fitzpatrick alleged she remained ready and willing to continue performance and sought equitable enforcement of the agreement.

Issue

May a court of equity specifically enforce an executory agreement requiring one party to render continuing personal services and the other to accept them, where the agreement also includes a promise to make testamentary dispositions and the plaintiff alleges part performance? More specifically, does equity have jurisdiction to compel continued performance of this personal services arrangement during Michael's lifetime?

Rule

A contract to make a will is not invalid merely because of its subject matter, but if it concerns land it falls within the Statute of Frauds unless removed by part performance. Even where part performance could remove the statutory bar, equity ordinarily will not specifically enforce an executory personal services contract, because courts cannot effectively supervise such decrees and should not compel unwilling parties to maintain continuing personal and confidential relations. Relief akin to specific performance may be available only after the services have been fully performed or the contract has otherwise ceased to be executory, and equity will not enforce a negative covenant in a personal services contract it could not affirmatively enforce unless breach would cause a distinct loss beyond the mere failure to perform.

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In Portland, Maine, Eleanor Voss agreed to live in Daniel Reeve’s townhouse, manage his household, drive him to appointments, and care for him when ill for the rest of his life. In return, Daniel promised weekly pay, room and board, and that he would leave her the townhouse in his will; after eighteen months, he ordered her out, and Eleanor sued in equity seeking an order requiring Daniel to let her return and continue performing.

Should a court of equity grant Eleanor specific performance?

Explanation. The majority rule is that although a contract to make a will is not invalid by subject matter, equity ordinarily will not specifically enforce an executory personal services contract. Here the requested decree would force Daniel to accept Eleanor’s continuing personal services and would require judicial supervision of an ongoing personal relationship. The absence of an adequate legal remedy does not by itself justify specific performance of such an executory service arrangement.