Goldwater v. Carter

United States District Court for the District of Columbia · 1979 · Federal Courts

481 F. Supp. 949 (1979)

Updated August 1, 2026

Federal Courtspolitical questiontreatiesstandinginjury in factderivative institutional injuryparticipatory legislative rightstextual commitment

Facts

President Carter, through the Deputy Secretary of State, gave notice on December 23, 1978 that the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China would terminate effective January 1, 1980 under Article X, which allowed either party to terminate on one year’s notice. The President did not submit the notice of termination to the Senate or to Congress for approval and maintained that he had unilateral constitutional authority to terminate the treaty. Plaintiffs claimed this deprived them of their legislative right to be consulted and to vote on termination. The Senate later adopted language stating that Senate approval is required to terminate any mutual defense treaty, but took no final action approving the President’s termination effort.

Issue

Whether members of Congress had standing to challenge the President’s unilateral notice terminating the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, whether the case presented a nonjusticiable political question, and whether the President could constitutionally terminate that treaty without the advice and consent of the Senate or the approval of both houses of Congress.

Rule

Individual legislators have standing when executive action inflicts a clear injury in fact on Congress as an institution and thereby injures the legislators’ participatory constitutional rights, even if theoretical political remedies exist, so long as there is no real risk that judicial review would circumvent an ongoing legislative remedy. A dispute over the constitutional allocation of treaty-termination authority is not barred by the political question doctrine where the Constitution contains no express or inferable textual commitment of unilateral termination power to the President and the court is only interpreting constitutional allocation of power. Under the circumstances of this case, a significant mutual defense treaty that is a law of the land may not be terminated by the President acting alone; termination requires either the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate or approval of a majority of both houses of Congress.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

The President sends notice from Washington, D.C., terminating a still-operative security treaty with Iceland under a one-year notice clause, without submitting the matter to either chamber. Senator Lena Ortiz of New Mexico sues, alleging both that her vote years earlier to approve the treaty has been undermined and that she has been denied her present constitutional role to be consulted and to vote on termination.

Under the court’s approach, which is the strongest basis for Senator Ortiz’s standing?

Explanation. The court distinguished between an insufficient claim that prior treaty-approval votes were impaired and a sufficient claim that current legislative participatory rights were denied. Standing rested on injury to Congress as an institution and derivative injury to the legislator’s right to be consulted and vote on termination.