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Gomez v. Toledo

Supreme Court of the United States · 1980 · Civil Procedure
Civil ProcedureSection 1983Qualified ImmunityPleading42 U.S.C. § 1983qualified immunityaffirmative defenseburden of pleading

Facts

Carlos Rivera Gomez alleged that the Puerto Rico Superintendent of Police violated his procedural due process rights by discharging him from police employment without a hearing. Gomez had submitted a sworn statement accusing other agents of offering false evidence, was transferred, later testified in court that the evidence was false, and then faced criminal charges initiated on information furnished by the Superintendent. He was suspended and discharged without a hearing, but the criminal case ended for lack of probable cause and a Puerto Rico commission later revoked the discharge and ordered reinstatement with backpay. Gomez then sued for damages under § 1983, and the defendant argued the complaint was defective because it did not allege bad faith.

Issue

In a § 1983 action against a public official who may be entitled to qualified immunity, must the plaintiff allege that the official acted in bad faith to state a claim, or is good faith instead an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by the defendant?

Rule

To state a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff need allege only two elements: that some person deprived him of a federal right and that the person acted under color of state or territorial law. Qualified immunity does not negate the existence of the plaintiff's cause of action; it is a defense, so the burden of pleading it rests with the defendant.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In Cleveland, Dana Ortiz sued Leon Mercer, the director of a county licensing office, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Her complaint alleges that Mercer, acting under color of Ohio law, revoked her professional license without notice or a hearing, depriving her of procedural due process; the complaint says nothing about Mercer's good faith or bad faith.

Mercer moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that because officials in his position may claim qualified immunity, Ortiz had to allege he acted in bad faith. How should the court rule?

Explanation. Under the majority rule, a § 1983 complaint states a claim by alleging only two elements: deprivation of a federal right and action under color of state or territorial law. Qualified immunity does not negate the plaintiff's cause of action; it is an affirmative defense. Therefore Ortiz was not required to anticipate that defense by alleging bad faith in her complaint.