GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce

Supreme Court of Texas · 1999 · Torts

TortsIntentional Infliction of Emotional DistressWorkers' CompensationEmployer LiabilityIIEDextreme and outrageous conductordinary employment disputerepeated harassment

Facts

GTE transferred Morris Shields to its Nash, Texas supply department as supervisor, where he oversaw Bruce, Davis, and Poelstra. Over more than two years, the employees complained that Shields daily used vulgar profanity, screamed at them, charged at them in a threatening manner, humiliated them, and intimidated them despite their objections; GTE investigated and issued only a reprimand. The employees eventually sought medical and psychological treatment for emotional distress and sued only for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The jury found for the employees and awarded damages.

Issue

Whether the employees' claims were barred by the Texas Workers' Compensation Act and, if not, whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support liability against GTE for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the supervisor's workplace conduct. The court also addressed whether repeated workplace harassment may be considered cumulatively, whether GTE could be held liable for Shields's intent, and whether certain evidentiary complaints required reversal.

Rule

Mental or emotional injury is not compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act when it results from repetitive mental trauma rather than a particular ascertainable event traceable to a definite time, place, and cause; therefore the Act does not bar such claims. In the employment context, IIED does not lie for ordinary employment disputes, but an employee may recover if the defendant intentionally or recklessly engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct, caused emotional distress, and the distress was severe; repeated or ongoing severe harassment may be evaluated as a whole in deciding whether conduct is extreme and outrageous. An employer may be vicariously liable for an employee's intentional tort committed in the course and scope of employment, and acts of a vice-principal may be deemed acts of the corporation itself.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

For eighteen months in Tulsa, a warehouse clerk, Elena Marquez, alleges that her department manager at Red Prairie Logistics regularly berated her, invaded her personal space, and humiliated her in front of coworkers. She develops anxiety, insomnia, and stomach problems over time, seeks counseling, and sues the employer only for intentional infliction of emotional distress; the employer is a workers' compensation subscriber.

What is the strongest argument that the suit is not barred by workers' compensation exclusivity?

Explanation. The majority held that repetitive mental trauma is not compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act unless tied to a particular undesigned, untoward event traceable to a definite time, place, and cause. When the alleged distress results from a continuing pattern over time, exclusivity does not bar the suit because the injury is not compensable in the first place. The other choices overstate the rule or rely on facts the opinion did not make dispositive. (Derived from GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce (n.d.).)