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Guinan v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts · 1929 · Civil Procedure

Civil ProcedurePropertyNegligenceInherently dangerous articlesProximate causeAgencyRegulatory violationsEvidence

Facts

The defendant distributed motion picture films and accumulated scrap film from repair work, which it stored in metal containers and vaults. Its head shipper, Doherty, agreed to give scrap film to Bowditch, and the jury could find that Doherty knowingly allowed Bowditch's men to carry the film away in burlap bags without warning them of its dangerous qualities. One employee, Shirley, carried a bag onto a streetcar and placed it near a heater; the bag ignited, with evidence of flame and an explosive report, injuring the plaintiff passenger. There was evidence that the film was highly inflammable, liable to explode, and that the defendant's agents knew this, while Bowditch, his son, and Shirley did not.

Issue

Whether the defendant could be held liable to a third-party passenger for injuries caused by scrap film after its employee delivered it in burlap bags without warning, where the film was allegedly inherently dangerous, the recipient allegedly lacked knowledge of the danger, and intervening acts occurred during transportation. The case also presented whether the employee acted within the scope of employment and whether violation of the fire regulation requiring scrap film to be safely disposed of could support negligence.

Rule

A seller or supplier of an article not inherently dangerous is not negligent absent proof that it knew or should have known of the article's harmful qualities. But where an article is inherently dangerous to life, limb, or property, a supplier who delivers it without notice of its dangerous qualities to a person lacking knowledge of those qualities may be liable to other persons for injuries that reasonably could be contemplated and that in fact result, so long as the injured person's negligence did not contribute. A violation of a statute or regulation is evidence of negligence as to consequences the law was intended to prevent, and an intervening act does not break causation if it ought to have been foreseen. An employer is liable for an agent's acts within the real or apparent scope of authority even if done contrary to instructions.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Cleveland, Orion Archive Services routinely trims old nitrate-based photo stock and stores the scraps in metal bins. Its shipping supervisor gives a sack of the scraps to Leo Martin, a maintenance worker from a nearby furniture shop, knowing Leo brought only a canvas tote and saying nothing about the material's tendency to ignite when heated; Leo has never handled such stock before. On a city bus, Leo leaves the tote beside a floor heater, the contents burst into flame, and passenger Dana Ruiz is burned.

Dana sues Orion for negligence. Under the majority rule, Orion is most likely liable if the jury finds which of the following?

Explanation. The majority recognized an exception to the no-privity rule for inherently dangerous articles. A supplier who delivers an inherently dangerous article without warning to a person lacking knowledge of its dangerous qualities may be liable to foreseeable third persons injured as a result, so long as the injured person's negligence did not contribute. Liability is not strict, does not depend on contract, and is not automatically cut off by the recipient's later handling if that handling was within the range of foreseeability. (Derived from Guinan v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp. (1929).)