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Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization

Supreme Court of the United States · 1939 · Constitutional Law
Constitutional LawPrivileges and ImmunitiesFreedom of AssemblyFree Expression in Public PlacesFederal JurisdictionMunicipal OrdinancesFourteenth AmendmentPrivileges or Immunities

Facts

Individual citizens, labor organizations, and a membership corporation alleged that Jersey City officials used ordinances and official force to deny them permits for public meetings, prevent distribution of leaflets and placards, arrest and remove participants, and exclude labor organizers from the city. The bill alleged respondents sought only peacefully to explain to workers the purposes and benefits of the National Labor Relations Act and related labor organization activities, without advocating unlawful action. The district court found officials had adopted a deliberate policy of excluding respondents from streets and parks, preventing peaceful distribution of nonoffensive literature, and forbidding meetings, often through force and violence. The city had granted permits to others, but refused respondents' applications under an ordinance requiring a permit for public assemblies and authorizing refusal when the Director of Public Safety believed refusal proper to prevent riots, disturbances, or disorderly assemblage.

Issue

Whether the federal district court had jurisdiction under Judicial Code § 24(14) to hear a suit by citizens alleging that city officials, acting under color of local ordinances, deprived them of rights to assemble and communicate about a federal statute. Whether Jersey City's street-meeting permit ordinance was facially invalid because it authorized arbitrary suppression of expression in streets and parks, and what relief was proper.

Rule

Informed discussion of national legislation, including peaceable assembly and oral or written communication on such matters, is a privilege inherent in citizenship of the United States protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against state abridgment. Under Judicial Code § 24(14) and R.S. § 1979, federal courts may entertain suits by individual citizens to redress deprivations of such rights under color of state law without relying on § 24(1) where the required jurisdictional amount is not proved. Streets and parks, though subject to reasonable regulation for comfort, convenience, peace, and good order, may not be placed under a licensing scheme that allows uncontrolled official suppression of expression.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In Cleveland, Nora Patel and Luis Romero, both U.S. citizens, seek to hold a peaceful sidewalk rally explaining a newly enacted federal workplace statute to local residents. City officials, invoking a municipal practice and ordinance, repeatedly block the rally and threaten arrests if the pair speaks in public streets.

If Nora and Luis sue city officials in federal court to enjoin this conduct, which is the strongest basis for jurisdiction under the lead opinion?

Explanation. The lead opinion held that peaceable assembly and oral or written communication concerning national legislation are privileges inherent in United States citizenship, protected against state abridgment by the Fourteenth Amendment. When individual citizens allege deprivation of those rights under color of municipal law, § 24(14) supplies federal jurisdiction. The Court rejected the idea that § 24(1) automatically applies and did not require prior state-court litigation.