Horning v. Hardy

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · 1977 · Torts

373 A.2d 1273 (1977)

Updated July 23, 2026

Tortsinjurious falsehoodadverse possessionconditional privilegeejectmenttrespassslander of titlemalice

Facts

The Hardys claimed ownership of disputed land in Timberleigh Village under their deeds and by adverse possession, while the Hornings claimed through a deed from the Martins and built houses on the disputed lots. Before and during development, Hardy and later the Hardys' attorney notified the Hornings, the Martins, and eventually a lender and purchasers that the Hardys claimed ownership and that development proceeded at the Hornings' risk. A survey obtained by the Hornings supported their title, while a survey obtained by the Hardys concluded that four of five houses were on Hardy land. After the Hardys filed suit and their attorney informed the lender and buyers on a scheduled settlement date, that settlement was aborted and no further sales closed.

Issue

Whether the trial court clearly erred in rejecting the Hardys' claims of title and adverse possession to the disputed land, and whether the Hardys were liable to the Hornings for injurious falsehood (slander of title) and related interference with contracts based on their assertions of ownership. More specifically, the tort issue was whether the Hardys' statements were protected by a conditional privilege and, if so, whether the privilege was defeated by malice.

Rule

In an action for injurious falsehood, the plaintiff must prove publication of a false disparaging statement to a third person, falsity, that the statement played a material and substantial part in inducing others not to deal with the plaintiff, special damages, and malice. Malice is shown by spite or ill will, by an intent to harm the plaintiff's interests in an unprivileged manner, or by knowing falsehood; where a conditional privilege exists because the defendant has a present economic interest to protect and asserts an honest property claim or threatens suit in good faith, the plaintiff must prove abuse of that privilege through knowing falsehood, reckless disregard for truth or falsity, or common-law spite, and mere failure to investigate is not enough. For adverse possession of unenclosed timberland, isolated acts such as cutting timber, dumping stones, or similar acts are insufficient unless they amount to actual, open, notorious, exclusive, and continuous possession of the area claimed.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Asheville, North Carolina, Dana Mercer believed a narrow strip beside her warehouse had been mistakenly included in a neighboring developer's parcel. She obtained a survey supporting her position and sent letters to the developer, its lender, and a pending buyer stating that she claimed the strip and would sue if construction continued. The sale fell through, and Dana later lost the title action because the judge found the boundary evidence inconclusive.

If the developer sues Dana for injurious falsehood, which is the strongest basis for judgment in Dana's favor?

Explanation. The majority recognized a conditional privilege when a person has a present economic interest to protect and asserts an honest property claim or threatens suit in good faith. To defeat that privilege, the plaintiff must prove malice, such as knowing falsity, reckless disregard, or spite. The mere fact that Dana ultimately lost the title dispute does not by itself establish abuse of the privilege.