Human Rights Commission v. LaBrie, Inc.

Vermont Supreme Court · Property

PropertyHousing discriminationMobile home park occupancy restrictionsFHPA9 V.S.A. § 4503(a)minor childrenmobile home parkoccupancy limit

Facts

Linda and Ernest LaBrie owned and managed a mobile home park and originally used lease terms expressly barring children under eighteen from residing there. After the relevant mobile-home-lot provision was repealed, they replaced the adults-only rule with a facially neutral two-person-per-lot occupancy limit, and no families with minor children moved into the park after they purchased it. Scott and Luanne McCarthy bought a mobile home in the park and were told that if they had children they would have to leave; after their child was born, defendants demanded that they vacate and filed an eviction action. Defendants claimed the occupancy limit was justified by septic and water capacity, but the trial court found no credible evidence supporting that justification.

Issue

Whether the trial court clearly erred in finding intentional housing discrimination against persons intending to occupy a dwelling with one or more minor children under 9 V.S.A. § 4503(a), where defendants used a facially neutral two-person occupancy limit after previously enforcing an adults-only policy. The case also presented whether defendants established a legitimate business-practices defense, whether emotional-distress damages required expert medical testimony, and how attorney's fees should be calculated.

Rule

Under Vermont's FHPA, intentional housing discrimination may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence; direct evidence is not required. A prior discriminatory practice, coupled with a post-legislation pattern of maintaining the status quo through a facially neutral policy, can support an inference that the neutral policy was adopted to continue discrimination. The FHPA business-practices exemption in 9 V.S.A. § 4504(4) is construed narrowly and cannot be used as a pretext for discrimination; at minimum, defendants must show the occupancy limit has a significant relationship to a significant business objective. Emotional-distress damages in a discrimination case may be supported by the complainant's testimony and the surrounding circumstances without expert medical testimony where the distress is within lay understanding. Statutory attorney's fees are generally calculated at prevailing market rates using the lodestar method, not the government's actual cost, but fees may not include time spent reconstructing time records that should have been kept contemporaneously.

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In Burlington, Vermont, Maple Hollow Cottages had long advertised itself as a "quiet adults community." After state law began protecting households with minor children, owner Denise Rowan removed that phrase and instead imposed a lease term limiting each cottage to two permanent occupants. Over the next four years, no household with children was accepted, and when Aaron and Talia Brooks had a baby, Rowan immediately served them with a notice to quit for exceeding the occupancy cap.

If the housing commission sues for intentional discrimination against households with minor children, which is the strongest argument for liability under the governing rule?

Explanation. Intentional housing discrimination may be proved by circumstantial as well as direct evidence. The majority held that a prior discriminatory practice, coupled with a later facially neutral policy that maintains the same status quo, can support an inference of continued discriminatory intent. Here, the adults-only history, the two-person cap, and the continuing exclusion of families with children support disparate-treatment liability. (Derived from Human Rights Commission v. LaBrie, Inc. (n.d.).)