Eight petitioners were charged, along with others, with conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 to violate and with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1955, which criminalizes conducting an illegal gambling business involving five or more persons. Each petitioner was convicted of both the conspiracy count and the substantive § 1955 count. Each petitioner received sentences on both counts, including probationary terms for the conspiracy convictions. The dispute concerned whether Wharton's Rule barred prosecution or punishment for both offenses.
Issue
Does Wharton's Rule prevent prosecution and punishment for both conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1955 and the completed § 1955 offense? More broadly, did Congress intend conspiracy under § 371 and the substantive gambling offense under § 1955 to remain separately punishable crimes?
Rule
Wharton's Rule applies only to offenses that require concerted criminal activity and operates only as a judicial presumption, in the absence of contrary legislative intent, that conspiracy and the substantive offense merge when the substantive offense is proved. The Rule does not apply where the statute and its history show a clear legislative intent to preserve conspiracy and the substantive offense as separate crimes.
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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In Cleveland, Congress has enacted a federal statute making it a crime to operate an unlawful wagering business that must involve at least six persons and meet a minimum revenue threshold. Nora Velez and five associates are charged with both conspiracy under the general federal conspiracy statute and the completed wagering-business offense, and Nora argues that the conspiracy count must automatically fail because the substantive crime itself requires multiple participants.
How should the court rule on Nora's argument?
Explanation. The majority treated Wharton's Rule as a narrow judicial presumption, not an automatic bar and not a constitutional command. Even when a substantive offense requires concerted activity, the decisive question is whether Congress intended the conspiracy and the completed offense to remain distinct crimes. If legislative intent supports separate punishment, the presumption gives way.