In re Estate of Marson

Supreme Court of the State of Montana · 2005 · Family Law

Family Lawsummary judgmentnonmoving partynoticeopportunity to be heardfull and fair opportunityRule 56putative spouse

Facts

Marson and Collins executed a handwritten declaration of common law marriage in 1987. During later dissolution proceedings, an affidavit from Linda Lundgren was filed claiming she had previously entered into a common law marriage with Marson that had never been dissolved; Collins had no knowledge of that alleged prior relationship before November 1999, and no determination was ever made about its validity. After Marson died testate in 2001 leaving Collins nothing, Collins filed a claim against the Estate asserting Marson had fraudulently told her he was divorced from Lundgren and seeking spousal benefits. The Estate moved for partial summary judgment on the ground that Collins was not a surviving spouse, but Collins first raised the putative spouse statute, § 40-1-404, MCA, only at an unrecorded hearing on the motion.

Issue

Did the district court err by granting summary judgment to Collins as a putative spouse when the Estate had not been given notice and a full and fair opportunity to address that legal theory and present relevant facts?

Rule

Although a formal cross-motion is not required for a court to enter summary judgment in favor of a nonmoving party, the court may do so only if the original movant has a full and fair opportunity to meet the proposition that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the nonmoving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This requires notice, an opportunity to be heard, and an opportunity to present facts concerning the ground on which summary judgment is granted.

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In a probate dispute in Billings, Nora Whitman moved for summary judgment arguing that Trevor Pike was not entitled to any statutory family allowance from her late brother's estate. In his response, Trevor argued only that the motion should be denied. At the hearing, however, Trevor for the first time asserted a different statutory basis that, he claimed, entitled him to judgment as a matter of law, and the judge immediately entered summary judgment for Trevor on that ground.

Was the court's procedure proper?

Explanation. The majority rule permits summary judgment for a nonmoving party without a formal cross-motion, but only if the original movant had notice and a full and fair opportunity to meet the ground on which judgment is entered. That includes an opportunity to be heard and to present facts relevant to that theory. A dispositive ground first raised at the hearing, followed by immediate judgment, does not satisfy that requirement. (Derived from In re Estate of Marson (n.d.).)