In re Marriage of Walter

Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, Division IV · 2024 · Family Law

2025 OK CIV APP 3 (2024)

Updated July 31, 2026

famlawdomestic violenceattorney feescustodyrelocationsupport alimonyproperty valuationlife insurance security

Facts

Mary Kate and Ryan Walters married in 2006 and had two young children before Mary Kate filed for divorce in 2019. At trial, Mary Kate sought sole custody, permission to relocate to Shreveport, child support, support alimony, and attorney fees, while domestic abuse was litigated throughout the case. Mary Kate testified to two physical-abuse incidents and repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and the trial court found Ryan committed domestic violence under 43 O.S. § 109. The decree also required Ryan to maintain life insurance securing future child-support and alimony obligations, and the court later awarded Mary Kate part of her requested attorney fees under 43 O.S. § 112.6.

Issue

Whether the district court erred in finding domestic abuse, awarding attorney fees under 43 O.S. § 112.6, granting sole custody and relocation, awarding support alimony, accepting Mary Kate's valuation evidence, and requiring life-insurance security for support obligations. The counter-appeal also asked whether § 112.6 required all requested fees or instead a substantial portion of reasonable post-petition fees.

Rule

Under 43 O.S. § 112.6, in a dissolution, separate maintenance, or custody proceeding, a victim of domestic violence who applies and proves victimization by a preponderance of the evidence is entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred after the filing of the petition, and the court must order the abusing party to pay a substantial portion of that amount. The statute does not require an award of all fees, but it does not permit excluding categories of post-petition fees based on a court-created time cutoff. In determining reasonableness, the court should apply Burk-type guidance, and security for child support or support alimony may cover only amounts due and unpaid at the obligor's death, not unaccrued future obligations.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In a custody action in Tulsa, Nina Porter files a motion under 43 O.S. § 112.6 seeking attorney fees. After trial, the judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence that Nina was a victim of domestic abuse by Omar Reed during the parties' relationship, but the judge denies fees because both parties acted unreasonably during litigation.

How should an appellate court rule on the fee denial?

Explanation. Section 112.6 uses mandatory language. In a dissolution, separate maintenance, or custody proceeding, once the applicant shows by a preponderance of the evidence that she is or has been a victim of domestic abuse and applies for fees, the court must award reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred after the filing of the petition, with the abusing party paying a substantial portion. The opinion distinguishes this mandatory entitlement from ordinary discretionary fee awards in domestic relations cases.