In re Winship
Facts
New York law defined a juvenile delinquent as a person between seven and sixteen who commits an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult. At an adjudicatory hearing, a Family Court judge found that 12-year-old Winship had entered a locker and stolen $112 from a woman's pocketbook, an act alleged to constitute larceny if done by an adult. The judge acknowledged that the proof might not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but applied the statutory preponderance standard instead. Afterward, Winship was ordered placed in a training school for an initial 18-month period, subject to annual extensions until age eighteen.
Issue
Does the Due Process Clause require proof beyond a reasonable doubt during the adjudicatory stage of a juvenile delinquency proceeding when the juvenile is charged with conduct that would be a crime if committed by an adult? More specifically, may a state constitutionally use a mere preponderance standard for that determination?
Rule
The Due Process Clause protects an accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged. That constitutional safeguard applies equally at the adjudicatory stage of a juvenile delinquency proceeding when the charged act would constitute a crime if committed by an adult.
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