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Innovative Clinical & Consulting Services, LLC v. First National Bank of Ames

Supreme Court of Georgia · 2005 · Civil Procedure
Civil ProcedurePersonal JurisdictionGeorgia Long-Arm Statutepersonal jurisdictionlong-arm statuteOCGA 9-10-91transacts any businessliteral construction

Facts

The defendant was an Iowa bank, a nonresident of Georgia. The Court of Appeals had concluded that no factual question remained that the bank did not commit a tortious act within Georgia and did not regularly conduct or solicit business in Georgia, engage in any persistent course of conduct there, or derive substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in Georgia. The Court of Appeals therefore rejected jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-10-91(2) and (3). But it considered subsection (1) only in a limited way, focusing on a breach of contract claim and the bank's lack of physical contacts with Georgia apart from postal and telephonic contacts.

Issue

Whether Georgia's long-arm statute, particularly OCGA § 9-10-91(1), should be given a literal construction so that a nonresident who transacts any business in Georgia may be subject to personal jurisdiction to the maximum extent permitted by due process. Also, whether the Court of Appeals improperly limited its subsection (1) analysis by requiring more than the statutory text demands.

Rule

Georgia courts must apply a literal construction to OCGA § 9-10-91. Under subsection (1), a Georgia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident who transacts any business within Georgia, and that provision extends to the maximum extent permitted by procedural due process. Subsections (2) and (3) remain distinct: subsection (2) applies to tortious acts or omissions within Georgia, while subsection (3) applies to tortious injury in Georgia caused by out-of-state conduct only when the statute's express regular, persistent, or substantial-contact conditions are satisfied.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
Mira Voss, an Oregon software consultant, spent three weeks negotiating by email and video calls with Peachtree Harbor Logistics, a Georgia company based in Savannah. She never entered Georgia, but she agreed to design a custom scheduling system for the company and exchanged draft terms, invoices, and performance updates directly with its Savannah office.

Peachtree Harbor sues Mira in a Georgia court over a dispute arising from that project. Mira argues Georgia lacks statutory authority because she was never physically present in the state. What is the best answer under Georgia law as stated by the majority opinion?

Explanation. The majority held that subsection (1) must be read literally. It is not limited by a physical-presence requirement, and courts may not engraft that restriction onto the statutory text. The proper analysis is whether the nonresident transacted any business within Georgia and, if so, whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with procedural due process. (Derived from Innovative Clinical & Consulting Services, LLC v. First National Bank of Ames (n.d.).)