Jackson v. Brownson

New York Supreme Court · 1810 · Property

PropertyWasteForfeitureLandlord and TenantAssignment of Leasewastetimberinheritance

Facts

The lease contained a covenant restraining the lessee from alienating without the lessor's prior permission and a covenant against waste, with forfeiture provided for breach of covenants. The lessor's consent to an assignment was obtained, making the assignment valid, and the original lessee remained liable for breaches by his assignee. The assignee or tenant cut down wood on almost every acre of the demised premises, allegedly destroying nearly all the timber. The lessor later accepted rent, but the record did not show that the lessor knew a forfeiture had been incurred when doing so.

Issue

Whether cutting down nearly all the wood on the leased premises constituted waste under the lease so as to give the lessor a right of entry for forfeiture, and whether acceptance of rent barred that forfeiture as a waiver. The case also implicated whether the assignment was valid despite the lease's restraint on alienation.

Rule

A covenant against waste is breached when the tenant cuts wood in such a manner as materially and permanently to prejudice the inheritance or cause lasting injury to the reversion. In this state, a tenant may cut some timber to fit land for cultivation, but not so much as to destroy nearly all timber or irreparably injure the reversion. Where a lease forbids assignment without the lessor's permission, the lessor's consent makes the assignment valid; and acceptance of rent is not a waiver of forfeiture unless the lessor knew at the time that the forfeiture had been incurred.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

Nadia Flores leased a 200-acre farm outside Albany, New York, from Mercer Ridge Holdings under a lease forbidding assignment without the lessor's prior written permission. Six months later, Mercer Ridge expressly approved Nadia's transfer of the lease to Owen Pike, who took possession.

If Mercer Ridge later argues that the assignment was void because the lease restricted alienation, which is the best answer?

Explanation. The majority treated a covenant restraining assignment without permission as being for the lessor's benefit. Once the lessor consents, the assignment is legal, and the parties stand as though the lease had contained no such restraint. The lessor's consent therefore removes the objection based on the anti-assignment clause.