Jones Apparel Group, Inc. v. Maxwell Shoe Company
Facts
Maxwell's Article VII provided that the record date for stockholders entitled to consent in writing to any action would be the first date on which a signed written consent was delivered to the corporation. After Jones announced a consent solicitation to remove Maxwell's board, Maxwell's board set March 25, 2004 as the record date even though Maxwell later admitted it had not yet received any written consent. Jones then delivered an executed written consent on April 21, 2004 and argued that Article VII made that date the record date. Maxwell contended either that Article VII should be read to preserve the board's power under DGCL § 213(b) or, if not, that Article VII was invalid.
Issue
Does Maxwell's charter provision unambiguously prevent the board from setting the record date for a written-consent solicitation, and if so, is that restriction valid under the DGCL despite § 213(b)'s grant of authority to boards to fix record dates?
Rule
An unambiguous charter provision controls the method for setting a consent-solicitation record date. Under DGCL §§ 102(b)(1) and 141(a), a certificate of incorporation may create, define, limit, or regulate directors' powers, including restricting board authority otherwise recognized by statute, unless the charter provision transgresses a mandatory statutory rule or a settled Delaware public policy implicit in the DGCL or common law. Section 213(b) supplies a default regime and does not, by itself, make board authority to set consent record dates inalienable.
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