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Kennedy v. Southern California Edison Co.

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Civil Procedure

Civil ProcedureJury InstructionsProducts LiabilityPrice-Anderson ActCausationPrice-AndersonCalifornia substantive lawRutherford

Facts

Ellen Kennedy died of chronic myelogenous leukemia in 1996. Plaintiffs alleged that while Joe Kennedy worked at SONGS, he carried home microscopic radioactive particles known as "fuel fleas" on his clothing, hair, and tools, and that this exposure caused Mrs. Kennedy's cancer. They also alleged that Combustion Engineering defectively produced fuel rods that ruptured and released the radioactive particles. At trial, defendants argued other possible causes of Mrs. Kennedy's CML and the district court instructed only with the standard California substantial-factor instructions, not a Rutherford instruction.

Issue

Whether California law required a Rutherford causation instruction in this hazardous-substance case where defendants raised alternative possible causes of the injury, even though the case effectively involved a single source defendant on the causation issue. Whether the district court also erred in dismissing the California strict products liability claims against Combustion Engineering.

Rule

In a California hazardous-substance cancer case, when a defendant raises alternative possible causes, the jury must be instructed that the plaintiff need not prove the defendant's substance actually initiated the disease process, but may prove causation by showing that exposure to the defendant's substance, in reasonable medical probability, was a substantial factor contributing to the plaintiff's risk of developing cancer. If a requested instruction imperfectly states the law but alerts the court to an important issue requiring instruction, the district court must frame and give a proper instruction. Under California strict products liability, a manufacturer that places a defective product on the market may be liable to foreseeable bystanders as well as users, so long as the claim fits within Price-Anderson's federally defined duty framework.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In federal court in California, Lena Ortiz sues Sierra Thermal Services, alleging that solvent vapors from its industrial degreaser caused her leukemia. Sierra Thermal denies liability and argues the illness was instead caused by Lena’s smoking history and prior exposure to pesticides on a farm in Fresno County.

What causation instruction is most appropriate if the evidence otherwise supports submitting causation to the jury?

Explanation. The majority held that the Rutherford-type instruction applies not only in asbestos or multiple-defendant cases, but also in single-defendant hazardous-substance cancer cases when the defense raises alternative possible causes. The plaintiff need not prove the defendant’s particles actually began the malignant process, but must show that exposure was, in reasonable medical probability, a substantial factor contributing to the risk of developing cancer. Burden shifting is not required, and mere possible contribution is insufficient. (Derived from Kennedy v. Southern California Edison Co. (n.d.).)