Kirchberg v. Feenstra

Supreme Court of the United States · 1980 · Property
450 U.S. 455 (1981)
Updated
PropertyEqual ProtectionCommunity Propertyhead and mastergender discriminationEqual Protection Clausesex-based classificationmortgage

Facts

In 1974, Feenstra's husband executed a mortgage on their jointly owned home in favor of Kirchberg as security for a promissory note for legal services. Feenstra did not know about the mortgage, and under former Louisiana Civil Code Article 2404 her consent was not required because the husband had exclusive authority over community property. In 1976, after Feenstra refused to pay the note, Kirchberg sought foreclosure. Feenstra challenged the constitutionality of Article 2404 in federal court and sought a declaration that the mortgage on her home was void.

Issue

Whether Louisiana Civil Code Article 2404, which gave a husband unilateral authority to dispose of jointly owned community property without his wife's consent, violated the Equal Protection Clause. Also, whether the Fifth Circuit's decision invalidating Article 2404 applied to the mortgage executed on the Feenstra home in this case.

Rule

An express sex-based classification is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause unless the party defending it provides an exceedingly persuasive justification by showing that the classification substantially furthers an important governmental interest. The possibility that the disadvantaged spouse could have taken steps to avoid the law's effects does not save an otherwise unconstitutional discriminatory statute.

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Test yourself

One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In Arizona, a statute provides that in a marriage, the husband alone may sell or mortgage community real estate without the wife's consent. Lena Ortiz learns that her husband, Marco Ortiz, mortgaged their Phoenix duplex to Desert Mesa Finance without telling her, and she challenges the statute in court.

How should the court most likely rule on Lena's equal protection challenge?

Explanation. The statute expressly classifies on the basis of sex by giving husbands, but not wives, unilateral control over community property. Under the majority opinion, such a law is invalid unless the party defending it provides an exceedingly persuasive justification by showing the classification substantially furthers an important governmental interest. Good-faith lending and proof of malice are not the governing test.